Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2018-14

State Remedies For Human Rights

Seth Davis
sdavis@law.uci.edu

University of California, Irvine ~ School of Law

Christopher Whytock
cwhytock@law.uci.edu

University of California, Irvine ~ School of Law

The paper can be downloaded free of charge from SSRN at:

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

STATE REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
SETH DAVIS & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 399
I. STATE REMEDIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM ............................................................................................... 406
II. CATEGORICAL FEDERALISM AND THE CASE AGAINST STATE
REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS...................................... 412
A. The Case Against State Remedies for Human Rights
Violations..................................................................................... 414
B. Responding to Categorical Federalism in Human Rights
Enforcement................................................................................. 419
III. HUMAN RIGHTS FEDERALISM: STATE AUTHORITY AND STATE
INTERESTS ........................................................................................... 423
A. State Law ..................................................................................... 425
1. State Law for the Redress of Wrongs .................................... 426
2. State Remedial Interests and Human Rights ......................... 429
B. Federal Law ................................................................................ 436
1. Federal Recognition of a State’s Interest in Providing
Remedies ............................................................................... 437
2. Judicial Federalism and International Human Rights ............ 440
C. International Law ........................................................................ 444
1. Treaties .................................................................................. 444
2. Customary International Law ................................................ 446
D. Political Theory ........................................................................... 447
1. Corrective Justice .................................................................. 447
2. Social Contract Theory: Contracts Among Nations and
Among People ....................................................................... 448
3. Cosmopolitan Theory ............................................................ 449
E. The Limits of the Aspiration to Provide Law for the Redress
of Wrongs .................................................................................... 450



Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
For their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the authors thank Andrew Bradt, Stephen
Burbank, Erwin Chemerinsky, Donald Earl Childress III, Zachary Clopton, Martha Davis,
William Dodge, Maggie Gardner, Katerina Linos, Leah Litman, Burt Neuborne, Mathias
Reimann, and participants in the Colloquium on International and Comparative Law and
Politics at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law, and in a workshop at the
University of South Carolina School of Law. For excellent research assistance, the authors
thank Judy Chin, Christine Fan, and Honieh Udenka.


397

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

398

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:397

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS
AND UNDER STATE LAW ..................................................................... 452
A. State Interests and Court Access Doctrines................................. 454
1. Foreign Relations Removal ................................................... 454
2. Political Question Doctrine ................................................... 457
3. Personal Jurisdiction.............................................................. 461
4. Forum Non Conveniens......................................................... 466
B. The Applicable Law ..................................................................... 470
1. Choice of Law ....................................................................... 470
2. Preemption............................................................................. 474
a. State Tort Law ................................................................ 474
i. The Remedial Function of State Law ...................... 475
ii. Weighing a State’s Remedial Interests .................... 477
b. State Remedies for Customary International Law .......... 479
c. State Remedies for Treaty Rights .................................... 482
CONCLUSION................................................................................................... 483
Within the United States, states are the source of remedies for most legal
wrongs. State law provides remedies for common law torts, statutory violations,
and constitutional rights, and state courts are available to parties seeking these
remedies. May states also provide remedies for the victims of international
human rights violations? With the Supreme Court closing the door on human
rights litigation in U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute, and with
plaintiffs therefore turning to state courts and state law to redress violations of
international human rights, this question has become especially important.
The dominant view among courts and commentators, however, treats human
rights remedies as a foreign relations function committed to the federal
government. If the federal government decides not to provide these remedies,
then, this view holds, states must not provide them either.
This Article challenges that position. It argues that states may provide
remedies for international human rights, much as they do for torts and civil
rights. States provide law and courts for the redress of wrongs as a matter of
course, particularly the types of torts that most human rights litigation
addresses. Within the federal system, states have independent authority to
provide remedies for legal wrongs. State courts and state law therefore play a
fundamental role in fulfilling the aspiration that rights entail remedies. Under
state law, federal law, and international law, states have a recognized interest
in providing redress for human rights violations. And in many cases, a state’s
interest in providing remedies for human rights violations will outweigh the
business or foreign relations costs of human rights litigation that are often
invoked to deny remedies.
This Article’s theory of state remedies for human rights has doctrinal and
normative implications. The proper application of various doctrines that may
limit access to state courts or the application of state law requires explicit
consideration of the state interest in providing remedies for human rights.
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Normatively, this Article’s theory of state remedies for human rights provides a
justification for doctrinal changes in order to accommodate that interest.
INTRODUCTION
Should U.S. courts provide remedies to victims of international human rights
violations? International and regional human rights bodies have limited capacity
to do so.1 For this reason, the international human rights system depends
primarily on domestic law to provide personal remedies.2 Often, however,
victims of human rights abuses will find it futile to seek a remedy in a domestic
court of the country where the abuses occurred.3 Therefore, the domestic courts
of other countries also have a role to play in providing law for the redress of
human rights violations. For more than thirty years, the U.S. federal courts have
played a role by adjudicating human rights claims under the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”).4
The Supreme Court, however, has sharply limited the ability of the federal
courts to hear ATS claims. The Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain5 limited the types of customary international law (“CIL”) rules that can
serve as the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.6 Most
recently, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,7 the Court limited the
territorial scope of permissible claims in federal courts under the ATS, and
according to some commentators, brought an end to the era of human rights
litigation in federal courts.8 Whatever the precise scope of Kiobel’s holding, the

1

See BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS
xxv (2d ed. 2008).
2 See id.
3 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 457, 458 (2001); Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign State Immunity and the Right to
Court Access, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2033, 2074-75 (2013) (finding that in more than half of cases
in which access to U.S. courts is denied to plaintiffs on foreign-sovereign-immunity grounds,
courts in foreign jurisdiction either lack judicial independence or are only partly independent).
4 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that United States has
federal jurisdiction under ATS to provide court access to alien parties who file suit against
alleged torturers, regardless of parties’ nationalities).
5 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
6 Id. at 732 (“We are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when
[ATS] was enacted.”).
7 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
8 Id. at 1669 (holding that ATS claims must “touch and concern” United States “with
sufficient force” to overcome presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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Court may be poised in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC9 to cut back further by limiting
corporate liability under the ATS.10
In the American federal system, however, federal courts are not the only
forums for providing law to redress wrongs. With the door closing on ATS suits
in federal courts, attention is turning to suits asserting human rights claims in
state courts based on state or foreign tort law or international law, and in federal
courts based on state tort law.11 The turn to state remedies for human rights is
not unprecedented.12 For example, in Doe v. Unocal Corp.,13 a California trial
court applied California law to plaintiffs’ claims that a California corporation
was complicit in human rights abuses in Burma and allowed the case to proceed

9

137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017).
Id. at 1432 (granting writ of certiorari in In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute
Litigation, 808 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2015), in which court of appeals held that district court
did not abuse its discretion when denying leave to amend consolidated complaints brought
under ATS by parties injured overseas).
11 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the Rise of
Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1091 (2014) (arguing that “demise of
ATS will signal rise of transnational tort litigation” of human rights claims); Donald Earl
Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational
Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 715 (2012) (arguing that human rights claimants will
increasingly rely on state and foreign law); Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at
Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139, 179-84 (2006); Marco Simons, Keynote Address, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum: A Practitioner’s Viewpoint, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 28, 41 (2013)
(“[T]here is still no likelihood that transnational human rights litigation is going away anytime
soon—the state courts remain open to transnational lawsuits for transitory torts.”); Beth
Stephens, State Law Claims: The Next Phase of Human Rights Litigation, 108 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 442, 442 (2014) (stating that “victims of human rights abuses [after Kiobel]
will increasingly file their claims in state courts”); Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl
Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey, After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in
State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (“[P]laintiffs alleging
human rights violations are increasingly likely to consider pursuing their claims in state courts
or under state law.”); Svetlana Meyerzen Nagiel, Note, An Overlooked Gateway to Victim
Compensation: How States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights Claims, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 133, 133 (2007) (advocating “state statutory and common law causes of
action” as “viable alternatives” to ATS). Another possibility is that state choice-of-law rules
will point towards foreign law as a source for rights of action in human rights cases. See infra
Section IV.B.1.
12 See generally Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under
State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013) (“Long before the Second
Circuit decided the Filártiga case, human rights advocates looked to state courts to enforce
international human rights norms.”).
13 Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, 2002 WL 33944506 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 11, 2002).
10
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to trial.14 And in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.,15 human rights plaintiffs sued an
American multinational corporation for allegedly paying the Nigerian military
to carry out a “series of brutal attacks” against Nigerian villagers that left four
dead.16 A federal district court held that California tort law applied in light of
the state’s interest in protecting victims and holding domestic corporations
“fully liable” for wrongs.17 Though not yet common, there are other examples
of human rights plaintiffs seeking remedies for human rights violations in state
courts18 or in federal courts under state tort law.19

14

Id. at *14; see also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883-84, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(denying motion to dismiss). The federal district court granted Unocal’s motion for summary
judgment on ATS claims, a decision affirmed in part and reversed in part by a panel of the
Ninth Circuit, which remanded for trial. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1294
(C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932
(9th Cir. 2002). While a decision en banc was pending in the Ninth Circuit, the case settled.
See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting rehearing en banc).
15 No. C:99-cv-02506, 2006 WL 2455761 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006).
16 Id. at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006).
17 Id. at *10 (“[I]f defendants were found responsible for the attacks allegedly committed
by the Nigerian military but could not be held fully liable, California’s interest would be
significantly impaired.”). After trial, a jury found for the defendants. See Bowoto v. Chevron
Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).
18 See, e.g., Complaint for Damages, Kimata v. Al Shabaab, No. BC 615 963, 2016 WL
1321457 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 4, 2016) (asserting claims under state and federal law
against terrorist organization); Amended Complaint, Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colom., No. 12-48803-CA-02, 2013 WL 10967065 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed
Mar. 20, 2013) (asserting claims under international law, federal law, state law, and
Colombian law against Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (“FARC”) for human
rights violations); Verified Complaint, Funk v. Belneftekhim, No. 501907/2012, 2012 WL
2863982 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July 12, 2012) (stating claims under state law against defendant
for aiding and abetting human rights violations by Belarusian KGB); see also Caballero v.
De, No. 12-48803-CA-02, 2014 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 51243, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed May 2, 2014)
(granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability under international law and
RICO statute). The Opportunity Agenda, a nongovernmental organization, and Northeastern
University School of Law’s Program on Human Rights and the Global Economy periodically
publish surveys of human rights litigation in state courts. E.g., I. INDIA THUSI & MARTHA F.
DAVIS, THE PROGRAM ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
STATE COURTS (Elizabeth Ennen & Juhu Thukral eds., 2016), https://www.northeastern.edu/
law/pdfs/academics/phrge/state-courts-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YE3-WVQ2].
19 For a survey of human rights cases filed in federal courts under state law, see Nagiel,
supra note 11, at 167-76, and see Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation
After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1761 nn.84-86 (2014) (listing federal cases in
which plaintiffs involved in ATS litigation added pendant state tort claims or presented claims
alleging state law torts). By “foreign-squared,” we are referring to human rights cases that are
not wholly domestic, but nevertheless involve U.S. plaintiffs, U.S. defendants, or conduct
with a U.S. nexus, whereas when we use the term “foreign-cubed” we are referring to cases
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The idea of state remedies for human rights is, however, controversial.
Following the logic of “categorical federalism,”20 some observers identify
remedies for human rights violations as a matter of foreign relations vested in
the federal government. Like Chief Justice John Roberts in Kiobel, they tend to
see domestic remedies for human rights as being concerned with the “conduct
of foreign policy”21 and nothing else. Like the D.C. Circuit in Saleh v. Titan
Corp.,22 they tend to presume that when states provide remedies for human
rights, they are performing a foreign relations function committed to the federal
government.23 They are “puzzled at what interest” a state might have in
international human rights cases.24 They ask rhetorically, “[s]hould state law rule
the world when federal ATS law cannot?”25—suggesting that if the federal
courts have decided against providing remedies, then state courts may not
provide them either. Other commentators argue that “[s]tate law is ill-fitting for

like Kiobel, which involved foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and “exclusively foreign
conduct.” E.g., Brady Bizarro, “Vigilant Doorkeeping”: Post-Kiobel Corporate
Accountability Under the Alien Tort Statute for Negligence and Violations of the International
Prohibition on Nonconsensual Medical Experimentation, 33 B.U. INT’L L.J. 493, 507 (2015)
(providing same definition). There are considerable hurdles to Kiobel-style suits, even in state
courts, including personal jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750-51
(2014) (dismissing suit in “absence of any [state] connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or
victims” for lack of personal jurisdiction). The decision whether a state court may provide a
state law remedy in a foreign-cubed case requires working through a variety of doctrinal
limits. See infra Part IV (illustrating court access doctrines and principles that may limit
application of state law in providing remedies for human rights claims).
20 Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE
L.J. 619, 620 (2001) (describing “categorical federalism” as “constructed around two sets of
human activities, the subject matter of regulation and the locus of governance, with each
assumed to have intelligible boundaries and autonomous spheres”).
21 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) (“[T]he danger of
unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context
of the ATS, because the question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts may
do.”).
22 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (2-1 decision).
23 Id. at 9 (holding that alleged acts of abuse or torture were not in clear violation of
international law norms and thus not actionable under ATS).
24 Id. (“[W]e are still puzzled at what interest D.C., or any state, would have in extending
its tort law onto a foreign battlefield.”); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205,
230-31 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (asserting that “there is no
indication whatsoever that the Commonwealth of Virginia has any interest in having its tort
law applied abroad” in torture claim against private U.S. military contractor and emphasizing
that “federal government has exclusive power over foreign affairs”).
25 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SHOULD STATE LAW RULE THE WORLD? A
CALL FOR CAUTION IN APPLYING STATE LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL COURT CASES 15 (2013); see
also Childress III, supra note 11, at 755.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

2018]

STATE REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

403

human rights claims”26 and that that tort law cannot adequately address human
rights violations.27
More generally, human rights litigation in state courts faces some of the same
headwinds as ATS litigation. Against the backdrop of a resurgent nationalism in
politics, many Americans are questioning the United States’ interests in
international law and in advancing international human rights. Federal judges
have developed doctrinal limits on state adjudication, including preemption and
personal jurisdiction, that may close the state courthouse doors to human rights
plaintiffs, particularly in so-called “foreign-cubed” cases arising abroad. For
many, providing remedies for international human rights is not something that
U.S. courts, much less state courts, are competent to do. To address these
concerns, it is not enough to repeat the case for human rights litigation under the
federal ATS.
This Article develops the normative case for state remedies for human rights.
We argue that providing law for redressing wrongs is what states do, and for
good reason. Our argument is based on the constitutionally recognized remedial
authority and interests of the states. In the American federal system, states have
independent authority to redress wrongs. States provide law and courts for the
redress of wrongs as a matter of course, particularly the types of tortious wrongs
that constitute human rights violations.28 As one scholar puts it: “Human rights
violations are transnational torts. Torture is assault and battery. Terrorism is
wrongful death. Slavery is false imprisonment.”29 Even if federal rights of action
for human rights require special justification in light of the limited jurisdiction
of federal courts—a debate we do not and need not enter here—it does not follow
that state courts of general jurisdiction are incompetent to remedy human rights
violations.
States may provide fora and remedial law for the victims of human rights
violations, much as they provide for the redress of other legal wrongs. In Saleh,
for instance, Judge Merrick Garland dissented from the D.C. Circuit’s dismissal
of the plaintiff’s state law claims, reasoning that “one way to show that ‘people

26 Austen L. Parrish, State Court International Human Rights Litigation: A Concerning
Trend, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 25, 40 (2013).
27 Nathan J. Miller, Human Rights Abuses as Tort Harms: Losses in Translation, 46 SETON
HALL L. REV. 505, 540 (2016).
28 We acknowledge the concerns of those who argue that state tort law is not as well
equipped as international law to address human rights violations. See, e.g., id. at 506 (“[T]he
impending shift from federal to state courts will rob [human rights] cases of their public
character and will reduce them to ‘garden variety municipal torts.’ Such an outcome will
threaten the ability of such litigation to catalyze the kind of systemic change necessary to
address human rights abuses.”). However, we hope that our normative argument may partially
address those concerns. Moreover, when suits based on international law are not available,
our view is that remedies for the violation based on tort law is preferable to no remedy at all.
29 Alford, supra note 11, at 1091.
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will be held to account’ is to permit this country’s legal system to take its
ordinary course and provide a remedy for those who were wrongfully injured.”30
In the ordinary course, Judge Garland explained, individuals who “were beaten,
electrocuted, raped, subjected to attacks by dogs, and otherwise abused by
private contractors” would have a remedy under a state’s “traditional, generally
applicable tort law.”31 We argue that state courts may be open to perform this
remedial function, including in human rights cases, even where the federal
courthouse doors may be closed or federal law remedies may be unavailable.
Providing for the redress of wrongs is not a matter of foreign relations committed
to the federal government simply because those wrongs involve human rights
violations.
Indeed, providing for the redress of wrongs is a traditional function of state
law and state courts. Historically, the common law provided the means to redress
wrongs through the forms of pleading. The ATS’s framers assumed that state
courts would have jurisdiction to provide common law remedies for non-citizens
who suffered torts in violation of the law of nations.32 And state courts in the
nineteenth century provided common law relief in transnational litigation,
including cases arising from wrongs occurring abroad.33 In the modern era, state
law continues to provide law for the redress of wrongs, without guaranteeing
relief in all cases. This aspiration is reflected in the maxim that “where there is
a legal right, there is also a legal remedy,” which Chief Justice John Marshall
described in Marbury v. Madison34 as the “essence of civil liberty.”35 The rightremedy principle—“every right when withheld must have a remedy, and every
injury it’s [sic] proper redress”36—is the normative core of a state’s interest in
exercising its remedial authority to provide redress for the victims of human
rights violations. Not all wrongs are redressed through legal remedies.37 But the
30

Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Garland, J., dissenting).
Id. at 30 (“[T]here is no issue of ‘extending’ a state’s law here; the case involves only
the application of a state’s traditional, generally applicable tort law. That such law may apply
to conduct in a foreign country is hardly unusual.”); see also Seth Davis, Judge Garland and
the Future of Human Rights Litigation, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 18, 2016, 1:11 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/03/judge-garland-and-the-future-of-huma
n-rights-litigation.html?platform=hootsuite [https://perma.cc/9JNN-TVP2].
32 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).
33 Id. at 706 (collecting cases).
34 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
35 Id. at 163; see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109; John C.P. Goldberg,
The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress
of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 550-51 (2005).
36 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *109.
37 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778 (1991) (“Few principles of the
American constitutional tradition resonate more strongly than one stated in Marbury v.
Madison: for every violation of a right, there must be a remedy. Yet Marbury’s apparent
promise . . . reflects a principle, not an ironclad rule, and its ideal is not always attained.”).
31
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wrongs involved in many human rights cases, we argue, may be redressed
through relief under state law in federal courts, or in state courts under state or
foreign tort law or under international law.
Our argument is not that state courts or state law must always be available to
human rights plaintiffs. Rather, our argument shifts the ground of debate; what
presumptively seemed a “foreign relations” matter for the federal government
alone now appears a remedial matter presumptively for state courts to decide.
Our aim is to work through the normative arguments for state authority to
provide law for redressing human rights violations. With the focus on ATS
litigation, the normative case for state authority and remedial interests has
largely been missing from the debate over human rights litigation in U.S. courts.
Fundamentally, our aim is to clarify the hard choices that arise in human rights
cases, rejecting a categorical approach that focuses upon the reasons to limit
relief without due regard for the reasons to allow it. In any particular human
rights case, courts may face difficult choices among competing values, based
upon the demand for redress and pragmatic judgments about the risks of
satisfying that demand. In such cases, courts should explain how they made
those choices.
Three normative principles follow from our arguments. First, state authority
to provide remedies for human rights violations requires no special justification.
In the ordinary course, states provide law for the redress of wrongs, including
the types of tortious wrongs that human rights litigation typically addresses.
State authority to provide redress is the default; the limits are what require
justification. Second, courts, legislatures, and commentators should not presume
that the limits on federal jurisdiction in human rights cases extend to states. The
limits on federal ATS litigation may not apply, or may apply differently, to state
authority to provide remedies for human rights violations. Third, doctrinal limits
on state remedies for human rights violations should not be categorical, but
rather developed with awareness of the states’ distinct remedial authority within
our federal system and applied on a case-by-case basis. In developing these
limits, courts and legislatures should consider a state’s interest in providing
remedies and the importance of remedies for persons who have suffered human
rights abuses. If courts determine that these remedial considerations are
outweighed by concerns about the burden on multinational businesses or about
foreign relations complications, they should give explicit reasons showing why
they are outweighed in the particular case. Sometimes foreign relations and other
costs of state remedies will justify denying relief to a particular plaintiff. But we
believe that if taken seriously, these normative principles would enhance respect
for the constitutionally recognized remedial authority and interests of states
while taking into account critics’ concerns.
Our normative argument has important doctrinal implications. Some doctrinal
limits on federal ATS litigation—such as the political question doctrine—should
not, in our view, be a barrier to state remedies for human rights, except in
extraordinary cases. Other limits—such as the forum non conveniens doctrine
and personal jurisdiction—should be applied on a case-by-case basis that
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seriously weighs the availability of alternative relief and a state’s interest in
providing law for redressing wrongs. Under our view, moreover, cases filed in
state courts under state tort or foreign law would not be removable based on the
federal common law of foreign relations merely because the case is a human
rights case. Federal preemption would not in the normal course be a bar to claims
under state common law or foreign law, though it might limit state rights of
action to enforce CIL or human rights treaties directly. And although it is
difficult to generalize about choice-of-law analysis, a state’s interest in
providing remedies for human rights violations will often support the application
of that state’s law. The common thread to these doctrinal arguments is our basic
claim that if “what is needed to ground governmental power is a legitimate
governmental interest,”38 then state authority to provide law for the redress of
human rights violations is firmly grounded.
Our normative and doctrinal arguments proceed in four parts. In Part I, we
provide the necessary context for our argument by explaining the role of
domestic courts in the international human rights system and sketch the move
from ATS litigation in federal courts to human rights litigation in state courts
and under state law. In Part II, we present the categorical approach that would
halt this move in its tracks. In Part III, we lay out the core of our doctrinal and
normative case. We explain the structural principle of judicial federalism that
confirms state authority to provide remedies in human rights cases. And we then
explore a state’s interest in providing law for the redress of human rights
violations and demonstrate its foundations in state law, federal law, international
law, and political theory. We conclude that states may exercise a constitutionally
recognized role in providing law for redressing human rights violations. In Part
IV, we draw out the doctrinal implications of our argument for human rights
litigation in state courts and under state law. We do not argue that the demand
for redress of human rights violations categorically prevails over limiting
doctrines, such as preemption, personal jurisdiction, or the political question
doctrine. Instead, we argue that proper application of these doctrines requires
explicit consideration of the state interest in providing remedies for human rights
violations, and that by attending to this remedial interest, decisions in human
rights suits will better attend to the hard choices between providing remedies for
wrongs and the potential costs of litigation to businesses, foreign governments,
and U.S. foreign relations.
I.

STATE REMEDIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

One of the most important developments in international law since the Second
World War has been the growing recognition and codification of human rights

38 Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Extraterritoriality:
Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1514 (2014).
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in international treaties.39 Yet “[d]espite 50 years of rapid progress in the
recognition of international human rights norms,” international enforcement
remains underdeveloped,40 both globally and regionally.41
To be sure, there are significant international mechanisms that contribute to
human rights promotion and protection, including the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Human
Rights Council and its Special Procedures system, and human rights bodies
established by major human rights treaties such as the United Nations Human
Rights Committee—the body that monitors implementation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—and the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights—the body that monitors implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.42 In addition,
there are several regional human rights courts, including the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.43
However, although some international human rights bodies allow individuals
to submit complaints directly, they generally do not give individuals a right to
have their claims decided, and they generally do not have the authority to
provide personal remedies to victims of human rights abuses. Moreover, the
geographical coverage of regional human rights courts remains limited, as does
the willingness of countries to submit to their jurisdiction. Aside from the
European Court of Human Rights, regional human rights courts do not provide
reliable court access and availability of remedies to individuals.44 As a result,

39

Human rights have been codified in the following legal instruments: general treaties,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; specialized treaties, such as the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women; and CIL. See generally THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, DINAH SHELTON & DAVID P.
STEWART, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2002).
40 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 1, at xxiii; see also BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note
39, at 24.
41 See, e.g., BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 39, at 25 (“[P]rogress in the human rights
area is greatly hampered in many countries by endemic poverty, illiteracy, corruption and
various forms of discrimination that prevent large segments of the population from enjoying
their internationally recognized human rights.”); Gabrielidis, supra note 11, at 141 (“The
relevant [international law] bodies . . . either lack an enforcement mechanism or may lack
jurisdiction to hear cases where the U.S. is a party.”).
42 See DANIEL MOECKLI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 359-97 (Daniel
Moeckli et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014).
43 Id. at 416-57.
44 For an overview of the limits of regional and international human rights bodies, see
Gabrielidis, supra note 11, at 151-55.
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there often are no plausible avenues for victims of human rights violations to
seek remedies at the international or regional level.45
For these reasons, the international human rights system depends on domestic
enforcement.46 In many cases, however, the victim of a human rights violation
may not have a meaningful opportunity to obtain a remedy from the domestic
courts of the country where the violation occurred.47 For instance, a government
may threaten persons who seek such remedies.48 Even short of threats, the
country that has violated a person’s human rights may lack rule of law or have
courts that are not independent from the government, making the pursuit of
remedies there futile.49
When remedies are unavailable internationally or in the country where the
violation occurred, the victim of a human rights violation may seek redress in
the domestic courts of another country.50 Litigation in other countries’ domestic
courts is not necessarily the best way to redress violations of human rights. But
litigation of human rights claims in the third countries’ domestic courts is “an
important tool in the struggle to protect human rights” where alternative
remedial mechanisms are inadequate.51

45

See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 1, at xxv.
Id.
47 See MARK GIBNEY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: RETURNING TO UNIVERSAL
PRINCIPLES 122 (2d ed. 2016) (“[T]he problem . . . is that the state that has violated human
rights is the same entity that is primarily responsible for enforcing the law—against itself!
This, of course, has almost never taken place . . . .”).
48 See, e.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that plaintiff
sought remedy in Paraguayan courts following son’s murder and that government officials
allegedly responded by arresting plaintiff’s attorney and threatening him with death).
49 See Bradley, supra note 3, at 458 (arguing that U.S. courts should provide remedies for
international human rights victims who cannot obtain domestic relief); Whytock, supra note
3, at 2075 (finding that in more than half of cases in which U.S. courts deny court access to
plaintiffs on foreign sovereign immunity grounds, courts in foreign jurisdiction in question
either lack judicial independence or are only partly independent).
50 See GIBNEY, supra note 47, at 124 (“There are few (if any) ‘places’ where individuals
can bring a claim for a violation of their human rights.”).
51 See Beth Stephens, The Civil Lawsuit as a Remedy for International Human Rights
Violations Against Women, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 143, 154 (“ACTA and TVPA litigation
has proven to be an important tool in the struggle to protect human rights. The impact of these
cases on both the individual plaintiffs and the human rights movement in their home countries
and elsewhere should not be underestimated.”); see also GIBNEY, supra note 47, at 130 (noting
importance of “domestic courts of outside states” in addressing human rights violations);
Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational PublicLaw Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1028 (2015).
46
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For more than three decades, federal courts played a significant role in making
personal remedies available to alleged victims of human rights abuses.52
Beginning in the 1980s, the federal courts began hearing human rights claims
under the ATS, which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”53 In its 1980 decision in
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,54 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the ATS provided subject matter jurisdiction over a claim of torture brought
by Paraguayan citizens against a Paraguayan police official.55 Following
Filártiga, litigation in federal courts under the ATS became the most prominent
form of human rights litigation in the United States.56
By the early 2000s, the Supreme Court began imposing new limitations on
ATS litigation. In its 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,57 the Court held
that “although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action,” the federal courts are authorized to recognize common law “private
causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations.”58 The Court
emphasized that “federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”59 Scholars generally agree that
Sosa narrowed the scope of possible causes of action that could be pursued under

52 Beyond U.S. federal courts, the domestic courts of other nations have also opened their
doors to human rights claims. See Robert McCorquodale, Waving, Not Drowning: Kiobel
Outside the United States, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 846, 846 (2013); see also id. at 851 (“The effect
of EU regulations and the use of imaginative common law tort claims and civil law criminal
procedures, combined with innovative legal techniques, have enabled the development of
effective litigation outside the United States that avoids many of the difficulties seen in ATS
claims.”); 50 Human Rights Cases You Need to Know, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.
ouplaw.com/page/426/50-human-rights-cases-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/MM59TB3Y] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
53 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
54 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
55 Id. at 890 (“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become . . . an enemy of all
mankind. Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people
from brutal violence.”).
56 See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human
Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 65, 67 (1995).
57 542 U.S. 692 (2008).
58 Id. at 724.
59 Id. at 732-33. These paradigmatic violations included “offenses against ambassadors,
violation of safe conducts, and piracy.” Id. at 694.
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the ATS.60 Although the Court cited the Filártiga court’s recognition of a right
of action for torture with approval,61 it declined to recognize a right of action for
arbitrary detention.
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of ATS litigation.62
In Kiobel, the issue was “whether and under what circumstances courts may
recognize a cause of action under the ATS, for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”63 The
court held that “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims
under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”64 It
acknowledged, however, that the presumption may be displaced “where the
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient
force.”65 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Court
had left open several “significant questions,” and therefore the proper
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application “may
require some further elaboration and explanation.”66 But on the specific facts of
the Kiobel case, where “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United
States,” the plaintiff’s ATS suit was dismissed.67
Although human rights litigation under the ATS in federal courts is not over,
it has been narrowed quite dramatically.68 One scholar goes so far as to suggest
that the Kiobel decision “signals the end of [the] Filartiga human rights
revolution” and “will foreclose the vast majority of ATS cases.”69
The Court is poised to cut back further on ATS litigation in Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC.70 Kiobel left open the question of whether liability under the ATS
extends to corporate defendants.71 Jesner presents that question, as the corporate
defendant argues that corporate liability is not “universally recognized” in
international law and therefore does not satisfy Sosa’s standard.72 If the Court

60

See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 12, at 18 (“[S]tate tort law should offer broader coverage
than ATS claims, which are limited by the historical paradigm test in Sosa.”).
61 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).
62 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
63 Id. at 1662.
64 Id. at 1669.
65 Id.
66 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 11, at 1098.
69 Id. at 1097-98.
70 808 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017).
71 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
72 Brief for Respondent at 4, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017) (No. 16499), 2017 WL 3668990, at *3.
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holds that human rights plaintiffs may not sue corporations under the ATS, then
it will indeed foreclose most ATS litigation.73
As a result, lawyers and scholars are turning their attention to state remedies
for human rights violations.74 States can provide remedies for human rights
violations in at least two ways. First, they can make their courts available to hear
human rights claims—whether those claims are based on state law, foreign law,
or international law. Second, human rights claims—whether brought in state or
federal courts—can be based on state law, such as state tort law.
The turn towards state courts and state law is not unprecedented.75 To the
contrary, “human rights claims were litigated in state courts for decades before
Filártiga inaugurated modern ATS claims” and “post-Filártiga human rights
claims based on state law have been litigated in both federal and state courts on
behalf of U.S. citizens and when ATS claims were unavailable for other

73

See Alford, supra note 11, at 1091 (“[W]ith the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Kiobel, reframing human rights violations as transnational torts may be the only viable
alternative for redressing international wrongs through U.S. litigation.”).
74 Whytock et al., supra note 11, at 5 (discussing human rights litigation in state courts and
referencing existing scholarship); see also Alford, supra note 19, at 1749-50 (“The most
important alternative avenue [to ATS litigation] is tort law. Indeed, one could say that the
future of human rights litigation in the United States depends on refashioning human rights
claims as state or foreign tort violations.”); Alford, supra note 11, at 1091 (“The demise of
the ATS will signal the rise of transnational tort litigation.”); Childress III, supra note 11, at
715 (noting that debate regarding international human rights litigation is shifting from federal
courts and federal law to state courts and state law); Paul L. Hoffman, The Application of
International Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View from California, 18 INT’L LAW. 61,
61 (1984); Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that some human rights claims
that otherwise would have been brought in federal court will now be filed in state courts under
state law or international law); Burt Neuborne, Some Quick Thoughts on Transnational
Human Rights Litigation in American Courts After Kiobel, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. (Apr.
19, 2013), http://nyujilp.org/some-quick-thoughts-on-transnational-human-rights-litigationin-american-courts-after-kiobel [https://perma.cc/4ZU4-MRKZ] (“[M]aybe it’s time to
explore the international human rights enforcement capabilities of state courts.”); Simons,
supra note 11, at 41 (“[T]here is still no likelihood that transnational human rights litigation
is going away anytime soon—the state courts remain open to transnational lawsuits for
transitory torts.”); Stephens, supra note 11, at 442 (“[V]ictims of human rights abuses will
increasingly file their claims in state courts . . . .”).
75 See Gabrielidis, supra note 11, at 167-70 (discussing state court cases that have applied
international human rights law); Hoffman, supra note 74, at 65-67 (arguing that California
state court judges should apply international human rights law); see also STEPHENS ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 120-27; Nagiel, supra note 11, at 135 (“[S]ome foreigners have turned to
more novel alternatives, using state law—rather than the ATS—to bring their claims in U.S.
courts.”).
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reasons.”76 Following Sosa and Kiobel, however, it is unsurprising that “victims
of human rights abuses will increasingly file their claims in state courts.”77 After
all, “state courts [like federal courts] can also function as effective fora for
human rights accountability.”78
Human rights claims in state courts or under state law may be purely domestic
(when the plaintiff and the defendant are domestic and the relevant conduct and
injury occurred in U.S. territory), mixed (when there are both domestic and
foreign parties, or when relevant conduct or injury occurred outside U.S.
territory), or purely foreign (when the plaintiff and defendant are foreign and the
relevant conduct and injury occurred outside U.S. territory). Mixed cases are
sometimes called “foreign-squared” cases, and purely foreign cases are
sometimes called “foreign-cubed” cases.79 As we will show, the implications of
our analysis depend on which type of case is involved.
The human rights system relies heavily on domestic enforcement.80 For the
past three decades, federal courts and federal law have contributed domestic law
for the redress of human rights violations.81 But after Kiobel, any such
contribution from the United States will increasingly need to come from state
courts or under state law.
II.

CATEGORICAL FEDERALISM AND THE CASE AGAINST STATE REMEDIES
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

State remedies for human rights are controversial, however, even more so
than federal remedies. Supporters of human rights litigation in federal courts
under the ATS may worry that state remedies for human rights are at best a
distraction, and at worst a threat to U.S. foreign relations and the progressive
development of international law.82 For their part, critics of human rights

76

Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 12, at 11. The Opportunity Agenda, a
nongovernmental organization, has systematically tracked human rights claims in state courts
since 2007. See generally THUSI & DAVIS, supra note 18.
77 Stephens, supra note 11, at 442; see also Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 12, at 18.
78 Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 12, at 20.
79 See Bizarro, supra note 19, at 507-08.
80 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 1, at xxv.
81 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
82 One concern is that applying tort law in state courts rather than international law in
federal courts can trivialize human rights violations. As the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts put it: “[L]ooking to domestic tort law to provide the cause of action mutes
the grave international law aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a gardenvariety municipal tort. . . . [M]unicipal tort law is an inadequate placeholder for [human
rights] values.” Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995); see also Parrish,
supra note 26, at 41 (“There is . . . something uncomfortable about addressing claims like
genocide or torture through state common law claims of wrongful death or battery.”).
Professor Nathan Miller has thoroughly developed this critique. He argues that “translating
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litigation in federal courts under the ATS may charge that state remedies for
human rights present all the problems of ATS litigation and more.83 Common to
both criticisms of state remedies is the idea that domestic remedies for human
rights involve foreign relations conduct. The upshot of such criticism is that
human rights litigation should remain a matter for the federal courts, even if that
means dismissing most claims for relief.
In this Part, we sketch a strong form of this view to throw into relief concerns
about state remedies for human rights. Taken for all it might suggest, the logic
of “categorical federalism”84 might hold that state remedies are categorically ill
suited to redressing human rights violations. Human rights issues are foreign
relations issues, the argument runs, and the federal government has exclusive
authority to govern U.S. foreign relations.85 Therefore, if the federal courts have
decided against providing remedies for human rights violations, states may not
do so either.86
In addition, making some of the same arguments made against human rights
litigation in federal courts under the ATS prior to Kiobel, critics argue that state
remedies for human rights burden businesses, risk offending foreign interests,
and interfere with the conduct of foreign relations.87
Our goal is not to downplay these concerns. There are sometimes valid
reasons for American courts to deny state remedies for human rights violations.88

human rights abuses into tort harms sacrifices normativity at the altar of practicality, and in
so doing undermines many of the aims that have animated the last thirty years of human rights
litigation in federal courts.” Miller, supra note 27, at 514. Miller also raises the related concern
that the turn towards state law will undermine the development of international law as a force
for systemic change. Id. at 506. Similar concerns were raised in the Kiobel litigation. See Brief
for Amici Curiae Hassan Ahmed et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2165343, at *30 (arguing
that state courts would “produce decisions that could turn human rights litigation, currently
decided according to a uniform body of international and federal common law, into an unruly
patchwork of unpredictable rules”). On the other hand, state courts of general jurisdiction
have developed normatively rich bodies of common law that can provide redress for most, if
not all, of the wrongs that arise in human rights litigation in domestic courts. See infra Section
III.A.1 (arguing that states have common law authority to provide remedies for human rights
litigation). We believe, therefore, that it is important to consider the alternative of state
remedies in its own right.
83 See, e.g., Young, supra note 51, at 1121.
84 Resnik, supra note 20, at 620.
85 See, e.g., Young, supra note 51, at 1050 (discussing broad consensus among scholars
that international law is within federal realm).
86 See id.
87 See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
88 Some of these reasons—such as foreign relations concerns or fairness to defendants—
may weigh more heavily than a state’s interest in providing remedies, particularly in those
“foreign-cubed” cases that lack a meaningful U.S. connection. But, as Beth Stephens has
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As we will argue in Part III, however, the categorical approach to state remedies
for human rights overlooks states’ remedial authority under our system of
judicial federalism and their interest in providing remedies for human rights.
There is no good reason to presume that state courts and state law are excluded
from redressing international human rights violations.
A.

The Case Against State Remedies for Human Rights Violations

“Categorical federalism,” as Professor Judith Resnik has defined it, is a
“mode of analysis for which the phrases ‘truly national’ and ‘truly local’ are
touchstones.”89 Three assumptions undergird the categorical approach to
allocating authority between federal and state governments. First, this approach
“assumes that a particular rule of law regulates a single aspect of human action:
Laws are described as about ‘the family,’ ‘crime,’” and so on.90 Second,
“categorical federalism relies on such identification to locate authority in state
or national governments.”91 Third, and finally, “categorical federalism has a
presumption of exclusive control—to wit, if it is family law, it belongs only to
the states.”92
The appeal of categorical federalism is threefold. In theory, institutional
competence may match up with discrete categories of social life: States, unlike
the federal government, are competent to design family law, or so we might
conclude from the purportedly “local” nature of “the family.”93 Categorical
federalism might also promote democratic values insofar as it allocates exclusive
authority to governmental institutions that directly represent those most affected
by government action and fosters accountability by making clear to voters which
government actors are responsible for which actions.94 And a categorical
approach might best protect rights by limiting duplicative and unnecessary
regulation.
The Supreme Court has sometimes opined that states are categorically
excluded from matters involving U.S. foreign relations, going so far as to
suggest that states “[do] not exist” when it comes to “foreign relations
generally.”95 And, therefore, the Court has reasoned, “[p]ower over external
affairs . . . is vested in the national government exclusively.”96

noted, “it is a mistake to think that human rights litigation is typified by ‘foreign-cubed’
cases.” Stephens, supra note 11, at 444.
89 Resnik, supra note 20, at 619.
90 Id. at 620.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
96 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
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Categorical federalism may seem appealing as an approach to state remedies
for human rights. When it comes to human rights law, a categorical approach
draws a further distinction between the “national” and the “local” on the one
hand and the “global” or the “foreign” on the other. As Resnik explains,
federalism—or, more commonly, “states’ rights”—is often offered as a reason
not to bind state and local governments to comply with international human
rights norms.97 Further, the categorical approach would deny states authority to
engage with human rights norms in cases of “global” or “foreign” concern both
because human rights enforcement is a matter of “foreign relations” committed
to the federal government and because the enforcement of international human
rights is a matter for either international institutions or foreign countries’ own
courts.
A U.S. Chamber of Commerce report criticizing human rights litigation under
state tort law adopts this type of argument:
The appropriateness of applying state law extraterritorially also touches on
bedrock principles of the allocation of authority between federal and state
law as well as federal and state courts. The extraterritorial application of
state law threatens a delicate balance in light of the potential for
transnational forum shopping.98
The report argues that human rights litigation under state law, at least insofar as
it arises out of violations occurring outside U.S. territory, “is ripe for a foreign
relations and federalism disaster.”99 In addition, it argues that “courts lack both
a democratic mandate and institutional competence to address foreign policy”
and should look for legislative guidance before “affecting international
affairs.”100 The report therefore proposes a federal statute that would “provide
for removal of cases that touch on issues of foreign affairs” and require states to
apply the law of the place of injury.101
In a variety of doctrinal contexts dealing with both access to state courts and
the applicability of state law, courts have followed the logic of categorical

97

Resnik, supra note 20, at 666-67.
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 25; see also Childress III, supra
note 11, at 727 (arguing that these cases “will complicate the international policies of the
Executive Branch, thus forcing policy outcomes constitutionally vested in the elected
branches of government”); Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational
Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995, 1042 (2015)
(“[T]hrusting transnational cases into state courts risks creating discord in an important area
of international relations that requires the speaking of ‘one voice’ by the federal
government.”).
99 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 25, at 21.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 21-22 (“The most appropriate choice of law rule for Congress to choose would
probably be the law of the place of injury.”).
98
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federalism.102 First, a plaintiff’s claim is treated as if it deals with a “single aspect
of human action,”103 namely “foreign relations.” Second, that identification is
used to locate authority over that claim in a particular level of government (the
federal government). Third, the court presumes exclusive control (namely,
exclusive federal control).104
Consider a few examples from diverse doctrinal contexts. In Torres v.
Southern Peru Copper Corp.,105 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to remand to
state court, reasoning that removal was proper—even though the suit was based
on state tort law—because the suit implicated “foreign policy concerns” and thus
raised “substantial questions of federal common law.”106 In a different doctrinal
context, Judge Harvie Wilkinson stated the categorical position: “[G]iven that
the Constitution entrusts foreign affairs to the federal political branches, limits
state power over foreign affairs, and establishes the supremacy of federal
enactments over state law, the presumption against extraterritorial application is
even stronger in the context of state tort law.”107 In part, Judge Wilkinson
continued, the force of this presumption against state remedies for human rights
follows from state law itself: “A state’s interest in employing a tort regime is
largely confined to tortious activity within its own borders or against its own
citizens.”108
This categorical approach takes much of its normative force from concerns
about the impacts of domestic litigation on foreign relations. State remedies, by
implicitly passing judgment on the human rights practices of foreign countries,
might offend the sovereignty of those nations. As Professor Donald Childress III
argues, transnational cases may “interfere with the sovereignty of other
nations.”109 He suggests that transnational cases in U.S. courts “might interfere
with other, foreign measures to regulate or address the harm in question.”110 His
proposed solution is “to refocus . . . court-access doctrines . . . on state consent”
by having courts “seek to determine the precise sovereign interests at stake . . .
[to] encourage coordination between the United States and foreign

102

See Resnik, supra note 20, at 619-20.
Id. at 620.
104 See id.
105 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
106 Id. at 543.
107 Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 231 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Wilkinson,
J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 233.
109 Childress III, supra note 98, at 1042 (arguing that federal courts are reluctant to
adjudicate transnational cases for fear of interfering with sovereignty of other nations); see
also Childress III, supra note 25, at 727 (hypothesizing that ATS cases risk “offending the
sovereignty of international partners”).
110 Childress III, supra note 98, at 995, 1042-43.
103

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

2018]

STATE REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

417

sovereigns.”111 Professor Ernest Young notes a further concern from the
perspective of foreign nations, namely that these nations are “both
uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the American civil-litigation system.”112 Still
others argue that human rights litigation in U.S. courts is a form of “judicial
imperialism” that offends foreign interests.113
Such concerns may be heightened when litigation occurs in state, rather than
federal, courts. In the context of ATS litigation, foreign relations concerns were
used as a basis for an argument that human rights litigation in federal courts
encroached upon the foreign relations powers of the executive and legislative
branches.114 These doctrinal arguments were sometimes combined with
functional arguments that courts lack the institutional competence of the
executive branch to adjudicate matters of U.S. foreign relations.115 Chief Justice
Roberts relied partly on these premises in Kiobel, noting “the danger of
unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy.”116 If
anything, critics have argued, state court litigation poses an even greater threat
to foreign policy. After all, there are fifty states; were each to develop their own
human rights jurisprudence, it would threaten the president’s ability to speak
with one voice in foreign relations—not to mention the coherent, progressive
development of international human rights law. State courts, the argument runs,
have even less authority and competence than federal courts to make the
sensitive foreign relations judgments necessary when redressing violations of
human rights.117
That is particularly true, critics suggest, when domestic litigation gives the
power to enforce human rights law to unelected private litigants. For example,
Young argues that implying rights of action in human rights cases “cuts against
111

Id. at 995, 1043-44, 1046.
Young, supra note 51, at 1023, 1101.
113 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 45-48 (2003).
114 See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Chandler, NFTC and USA*Engage Cite U.S. Supreme Court
Decision to More Narrowly Define Alien Tort Provision as Important Step in Curbing
Erroneous Lawsuits, NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL (June 30, 2004) (quoting Bill Reinsch,
President of the Nat’l Foreign Trade Council and Co-Chairman of USA*Engage),
http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?Mode=View&articleid=1691
[https://perma.cc/D4KU-4J6V] (praising Supreme Court’s Sosa decision for “warn[ing]
courts . . . to be ‘wary’ of the foreign relations implications of using the ATS to impede the
‘discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs’”).
115 Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach
to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 220; Young, supra note 51, at 1056.
116 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013); see also Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2129, 2158 (1999); Childress III, supra note 98, at 995, 1046.
117 See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text (discussing critics’ arguments against
state court litigation of transnational matters).
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

418

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:397

the grain of federal-courts doctrine counseling restraint where Congress has not
explicitly authorized private litigation.”118 He argues that unlike criminal
prosecutions, which are conducted by government officials, private litigation is
initiated and controlled by private parties who are unelected and often
noncitizens.119 Linking the argument to foreign relations concerns, he argues
that “[t]he independence of the bar from government . . . heightens the potential
disconnect between ATS litigation and national foreign policy.”120 Accordingly,
the problem with private enforcement is that “it places the decision to initiate
human-rights litigation in the hands of persons with no particular mandate (and
insufficient information) to reconcile that litigation with their nation’s broader
foreign policy.”121
Among the potential pathologies of private enforcement are the costs that
frivolous litigation can impose on businesses. This seems to be a primary
concern motivating opposition to human rights litigation in U.S. courts.122
According to one business-oriented interest group, human rights litigation under
state law should be discouraged because of the risk that it “will hurt business
interests.”123 As the report explains, in addition to the threat of damages, the
“discovery process can be unusually expensive,” and the litigation lengthy and
time-consuming; moreover, even where a corporation has not violated human
rights, “[t]he mere filing of such a case can topple corporate stock values and
debt ratings” in light of the “[t]he extreme allegations.”124
Some critics argue that U.S.-based multinational businesses
disproportionately bear the burdens imposed by U.S. human rights litigation.
Because they are more likely to be subject to personal jurisdiction in the United
States than their foreign-based counterparts, they are more likely to be subject
to the supposedly more plaintiff-friendly U.S. legal environment than their
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Young, supra note 51, at 1028.
Id. at 1093 (attributing ATS’s “troubling” civil regime to private plaintiffs).
120 Id. at 1100.
121 Id. at 1121; see also Bradley, supra note 3, at 460.
122 See Brian Jacek, Alien Invasion: Corporate Liability and Its Real Implications Under
the Alien Tort Statute, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 273, 275 (2013); Young, supra note 51, at
1026, 1057. Empirical analysis casts doubt on the validity of this concern, at least for U.S.
businesses and businesses operating in countries with strong human rights practices. See Darin
Christensen & David K. Hausman, Measuring the Economic Effect of Alien Tort Statute
Liability, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 794, 809 (2016) (finding that “ATS increased the cost of
doing business for mining companies in countries with poor human rights records”).
123 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 25, at 23; see also Gary Clyde
Hufbauer, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789: Time for a Fresh Look, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L
ECON., May 2009, at 2.
124 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 25, at 13.
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competitors.125 This is said to put U.S.-based businesses at a competitive
disadvantage, thus reducing economic welfare.126 Relatedly, some critics claim
that human rights litigation in U.S. courts threatens trade and both inbound and
outbound foreign investment.127
B.

Responding to Categorical Federalism in Human Rights Enforcement

These concerns may motivate a categorical argument that because the federal
courts are declining to provide remedies for human rights, states cannot provide
those remedies either. As a recent interest-group report asks, “[s]hould state law
rule the world when federal ATS law cannot?”128
Our argument, which we develop in the remainder of this Article, is that the
states have independent authority to provide remedies for rights—including
human rights—and a constitutionally recognized interest in doing so. We
respond to the arguments for categorical federalism in three steps. In this
Section, we argue there are reasons to doubt the logic of categorical federalism.
This critique of categorical federalism clears space for Part III, in which we offer
an affirmative doctrinal and normative argument for state remedial authority in
human rights cases. Finally, in Part IV we return to the sometimes legitimate
concerns that state remedies may burden businesses, offend foreign
governments, or interfere with U.S. foreign relations. We argue that these
criticisms must be considered alongside the remedial function of state law and
state courts in the American system of judicial federalism.
Fundamentally, it simply is not the case that the states cease to exist in the
realm of foreign relations. As Professors Michael Glennon and Robert Sloane
have recently described, American states form agreements with foreign
countries, incorporate international law into state law, set up offices and send
125

We say “supposedly” because there are empirical reasons to question the extent to
which the U.S. legal environment is favorable to plaintiffs today compared to foreign legal
systems, especially in transnational cases. See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A.
Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign
Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 33 (2011) (arguing that “United States is
no longer as attractive to litigants as it supposedly once was, and that other countries will
increasingly draw litigants to their courts through a combination of ex ante forum selection
agreements and ex post forum shopping”). See generally Christopher A. Whytock, The
Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011) (documenting
conventional wisdom about forum shopping into U.S. courts in transnational cases and
presenting empirical evidence challenging it).
126 See Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 376 (2008).
127 HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 113, at 37-43 (forecasting potential “collateral
damage” that ATS litigation could bring by predicting , for example, that “$55 billion of US
FDI could be deterred by ATS suits” and noting that some “[multinational corporations] may
simply decide to avoid the United States in order to avoid ATS liability”).
128 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 25, at 3.
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representatives to other countries, adopt financial incentives to lure foreign
business and investment, form lasting relationships with “sister cities,” issue
their own statements on foreign policy, impose trade bans and “Buy American”
procurement rules, tax foreign businesses, welcome—or seek to drive out—
foreign immigrants, and regulate in myriad ways that impact other countries and
their citizens.129 Sometimes states make decisions impacting foreign relations
with federal support, while other times they do so despite federal opposition or
in the face of federal inaction.130 And as Professor Julian Ku has shown, state
courts have made law touching on foreign relations throughout American
history; indeed, in many instances, state courts have been at the front line of
meeting U.S. treaty obligations and developing CIL.131
All of which is to suggest that the logic of categorical federalism needs
rethinking. Conceptually, there is no “neat distinction” between foreign relations
and domestic matters reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.132 For
example, generally applicable state laws permit citizens and non-citizens alike
to sue for personal wrongs. Where international law requires remedies for
injuries to non-citizens, has the state made foreign relations policy if it provides
such remedies through generally applicable law?133 Or is the provision of law
for redress simply a matter of states doing what they typically do under the
American federal system? In exceptional cases with transnational elements,
contract enforcement, adjudication of a property dispute, or remedying a tortious
wrong might have implications for foreign relations. But the ubiquity of
transnational litigation in state courts or under state law makes a mess of neat

129

MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE
MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 60-73 (2016).
130 See Jean Galbraith, Book Review, Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs
Federalism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2131, 2133-34 (2017) (reviewing GLENNON & SLOANE, supra
note 129, and explaining that “increasingly transnational nature of our society has done much
more than raise the likelihood of state and local involvement in transnational issues”; “[i]t has
also made it much more likely that the federal political branches and state or local
governments will find themselves interacting with respect to these issues”).
131 See Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265,
291-328 (2001); see also Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States
Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 491-95 (2004) [hereinafter
Ku, New York Does Exist] (explaining how U.S. treaties in 1800s regarding alien property
rights were dependent upon states, and stating that, for most part, “federal government has
suggested it would rely on the states to implement and carry out any treaty obligations
involving alien property”).
132 See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at xvii-xviii (arguing that categorical
conceptual distinction between foreign and domestic matters is “myth”).
133 See Ku, New York Does Exist, supra note 131, at 498 (describing how state legislatures
created generally available rights of action for victims of mob violence that permitted noncitizens to sue for redress).
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conceptual distinctions between the conduct of foreign relations and
adjudication of a claim for personal redress.
While globalization has made such categorical distinctions difficult to
maintain, the basic problem stretches back to the early days of the Republic.
Consider, for example, Chief Judge James Kent’s opinion for the New York
Supreme Court of Judicature in Clarke v. Morey.134 Clarke, a British subject
residing in the United States, sued Morey for failure to pay a promissory note.135
Morey’s defense was that Clarke, as a citizen of a country with whom the United
States was at war, could not sue in a U.S. court.136 Looking to international law,
Chief Judge Kent rejected this defense as inconsistent with “enlarged views of
national policy.”137 “The right to sue, in such a case, rests on still broader ground
than that of a mere municipal provision, for it has been frequently held that the
law of nations is part of the common law.”138 As the Supreme Court noted in
1942, Chief Judge Kent’s opinion “set the legal pattern which, with sporadic
exceptions, has since been followed” as a matter of national policy.139 Providing
law for the redress of a broken promise was neither simply a domestic matter,
nor simply a matter of foreign relations committed to the federal government.140
Taken for all it seems to suggest, the one-voice model does not describe the
actual practice of foreign relations in U.S. courts. As Ku points out, “the U.S.
system tolerates more voices, at least with respect to international law, than
either the Court’s or Founders’ statements seem to indicate.”141 Indeed, as
Part III describes, the First Congress expressly anticipated that state courts
would have jurisdiction to adjudicate tortious wrongs that might be brought to
federal court under the ATS. More generally, scholars have argued that there is
little support in the Constitution’s text or original understanding for the “onevoice doctrine” or federal exclusivity in foreign affairs.142
Nor do we see any sound functional reason today to preclude states from
providing law for the redress of wrongs that might have foreign relations

134

10 Johns 69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
Id. at 69-70.
136 Id. at 70.
137 Id. at 74.
138 Id. at 72.
139 Ex parte Kumezo Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 74 (1942).
140 While the cause of action in Clarke v. Morey arose within the United States and
involved a contract dispute, in Part III we argue that state law’s function in providing remedies
for non-citizens extends to the redress of international human rights, particularly because
many human rights claims overlap with traditional torts under U.S. and foreign law.
141 Ku, New York Does Exist, supra note 131, at 527.
142 See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS ¶ 13 (2007)
(demonstrating lack of support in constitutional text and original understanding for federal
exclusivity in foreign affairs); David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953,
991-99 (2014) (critiquing one-voice doctrine).
135
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implications. The idea that the United States must speak with one voice in
international affairs has a long lineage and reflects the possibility that state
engagement in foreign relations might, in exceptional circumstances, bring the
United States into conflict with other countries.143 There is also a concern that
fifty states might reach conflicting results with respect to international matters,
and such conflicts might not be reviewable by the Supreme Court.144 We think
these concerns might arise in particular cases but do not justify a categorical rule
precluding states from providing law or fora for redressing human rights
violations. In any event, in practice it is unlikely that a decision of a state court
in a particular lawsuit would be understood as expressing “foreign policy,” not
to mention U.S. foreign policy. Foreign nations know that the United States is a
federal system with separate state governments and with courts at the federal
and state levels that are independent from other branches of government. As
Professor Peter Spiro has put it, “[t]oday, not only do other countries understand
that when California acts on certain matters, it is acting alone, they also enjoy
the capacity to retaliate directly and discretely against California.”145
In fact, there are functional virtues of allowing litigation in state courts or
under state law. Not only may states help fill enforcement gaps by providing
domestic remedies for human rights violations, but they may also contribute to
developing international law. Where a state oversteps, creating an actual foreign
relations conflict, the political branches, not to mention foreign countries,146
have no shortage of ways of responding. When, for example, the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts barred its agencies from transacting with anyone “doing
business” with the government of Myanmar, Congress quickly enacted a federal
sanctions regime, and Japan and the European Union lodged complaints with the
World Trade Organization against the state law.147 Against this backdrop, the
Supreme Court concluded in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council148 that

143 See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875) (noting concern that “a silly,
an obstinate, or a wicked [state official] may bring disgrace upon the whole country, the
enmity of a powerful nation, or the loss of an equally powerful friend”).
144 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (discussing “principle that [the
Court] will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds”).
145 Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1225-26
(1999); see also Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist
Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 793 (2013) (arguing on functionalist grounds for
“presumption in favor of state regulation” in foreign affairs, at least when the United States
is “hegemon of a unipolar world”).
146 See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 145, at 1225-26.
147 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 296-97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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Congress’s action had preempted state law.149 Some might see this episode as
an object lesson in why states should be categorically barred from the
development of human rights law. We think, however, the case teaches an
altogether different lesson. First, Crosby shows that the political branches and
foreign countries can respond directly and forcefully when a state’s actions
actually cause foreign relations conflicts. Second, as Glennon and Sloane have
argued, the case illustrates that state law can play an “affirmative role” in
prompting the political branches to consider the national interest in a human
rights dispute.150
State remedies for human rights raise valid concerns, but these concerns do
not justify prohibiting such remedies. Redressing wrongs is an important interest
that is not inherently federal, but it is one that states share in the federal system.
In place of categorical federalism, we suggest a human rights federalism rooted
in states’ independent authority to redress legal wrongs, including when those
wrongs constitute violations of human rights. What some characterize as a
“foreign relations” matter for the federal government alone is a remedial matter
presumptively for states to decide.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS FEDERALISM: STATE AUTHORITY AND STATE INTERESTS
This Part argues that states may provide remedies for human rights violations
even though federal courthouse doors may be closed. State authority to provide
law for the redress of wrongs is the basis for state remedies for human rights.
Providing law to redress wrongs is a basic aspiration of government and the rule
of law. Within the American federal system, state courts and state law play a
constitutionally recognized role in satisfying this aspiration to redress legal
wrongs. This role, we argue, extends to providing domestic remedies for
violations of international human rights.
Our argument proceeds in five steps. First, we argue that state law supports
state authority for, and establishes a state’s interest in, providing remedies for
the victims of human rights violations. Nearly all the states have recognized the
aspiration to provide law for redressing wrongs in their state constitutions, and
the remaining states have affirmed it in their common law. One of the basic
guarantees of the rule of law, Chief Justice Marshall observed in Marbury v.
Madison,151 is the “right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.”152 From this right follows the “general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.”153

149 Id. at 366 (holding Massachusetts law “invalid under the Supremacy Clause . . . owing
to its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives”).
150 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 299-300.
151 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
152 Id. at 163.
153 Id. (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *23) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This right-remedy principle, we stress, is aspirational. In many cases, Marbury
included, courts have denied remedies for legal wrongs.154 But state courts
provide law for the redress of many wrongs as a matter of course, among them
the sorts of tortious wrongs that also violate international human rights. We
argue that the aspiration to provide law for redressing wrongs, which all fifty
states have recognized, is the normative core of a state’s interest in providing
redress for the victims of human rights violations.155
The second step in our argument focuses upon structural principles of
American federalism. The U.S. Constitution reserves power to the states to
provide law for redressing wrongs. It presumes that state courts may be open to
provide relief even when federal courts are not. The Constitution does not
expressly prohibit states from exercising this function in cases involving
international human rights. To the contrary, the constitutional structure
preserves a role for state law and state courts to redress violations of human
rights.
The first and second steps of our argument work hand in glove. Structural
principles of American federalism confirm that states presumptively have the
authority to provide law or courts for human rights claims, which are like many
types of claims state courts routinely adjudicate. And the state law interest in
providing law for redress of wrongs not only supports those structural principles
but also is important for our normative claim that states should exercise their
authority in human rights cases.
The third step in our argument turns from domestic to international law.
International law may not require domestic remedies for human rights
violations. But we argue that international law, which has recognized the
aspiration to provide effective remedies for violations of rights, supports state
remedies for human rights.

154

Id. at 168-80 (refusing to issue writ of mandamus).
Scholars have noted that state courts’ common law authority supports state remedies
for human rights. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 19, at 1749-50 (stating that “one could say that
the future of human rights litigation in the United States depend on refashioning human rights
claims as state or foreign tort violations” and also arguing that there is not “anything that
prevents state courts from recognizing international law violations as state common law
claims,” albeit noting this latter approach as untested). More specifically, “state tort laws
represent a quintessential exercise of traditional state prerogatives.” Alford, supra note 11, at
1159. Our approach is different and more fundamental: We argue that state interests in
providing law for the redress of wrongs provide a state and federal constitutional foundation
for state remedies in transnational human rights litigation.
A preliminary word on our use of the term “state interests” is in order. Most, and arguably
all, of the limits on state authority in transnational cases require analysis of the state’s
“interest” in the dispute. Our use of the term “state interests” is broad; we mean to encompass
each of the senses in which state interests are relevant in doctrines bearing on transnational
litigation.
155
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The fourth step in our argument turns from positive law to theory. We argue
that political theory helps explain and justify the positive legal bases for a state’s
interest in remedying human rights violations.
Finally, we address the objection that the aspiration to provide law for
redressing wrongs is just that—an aspiration—and thus is too indeterminate to
provide normative guidance. Our argument is not that, as a descriptive matter,
state law stands as a guarantor of remedies for every legal wrong. Nor do we
argue, as a normative matter, that state law should provide such a guarantee.
Rather, we share with Professor Louise Weinberg the assumption that “what is
needed to ground governmental power is a legitimate governmental interest.”156
Our structural constitutional argument in this Part is that the American system
of judicial federalism recognizes a state’s authority to provide law for redressing
wrongs and that a state’s interest in providing this law grounds state remedies
for human rights.
To know when the state courthouse doors must close, we must first
understand why they might be opened to human rights plaintiffs. A state’s
authority and its interest in providing law for redressing wrongs provide a
constitutional basis for human rights litigation in state courts and under state
law. This constitutional basis persists notwithstanding doctrinal limits on federal
judicial authority and constitutional concerns about state participation in foreign
relations. Redressing human rights violations is about the basic remedial
functions of state courts and state law, not solely about regulating foreign
relations. Foreign relations concerns should not categorically prevail over the
interest in providing remedies for human rights violations.
A.

State Law

The first foundation of the state interest in remedying human rights violations
is state law itself. State law clearly sets out the government’s interest in
providing law to redress wrongs. In order to fulfill this interest, states have
created courts of general jurisdiction with the authority to provide remedies for
rights arising under state, federal, and foreign law. States have primary authority
within the American federal system to provide law for redressing wrongs,
whether through common lawmaking in state courts of general jurisdiction or
through state legislation. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly prohibit states
from exercising this authority in transnational human rights cases and imposes
modest constraints on state choice-of-law rules and extraterritorial state laws.
We think, therefore, that the analysis of a state’s interest in remedying human
rights violations should begin with the right-remedy principle under state law.

156

Weinberg, supra note 38, at 1514 (emphasis omitted).
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State Law for the Redress of Wrongs

The following words do not appear in the U.S. Constitution: “The courts shall
be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay.” They do appear, however, in the first
article of the Florida Constitution.157 It is worth dwelling on them for a moment.
First, Florida’s guarantee of legal remedy for wrongs assumes the existence
of “courts,” that is, government institutions vested with “general judicial
power[]”158 and tasked with “administering right and justice by due course of
law” through adjudication.159 Second, the constitutional guarantee makes no
apparent distinctions based upon the citizenship or residence of a claimant or the
place of injury; instead it directs courts to “be open to every person for redress
of any injury.”160 Third, the Florida Constitution’s apparent purpose in
guaranteeing a judicial remedy for “any injury” is to ensure “justice.”161
Nearly all state constitutions contain a similar guarantee of judicial remedies
to redress legal wrongs. Forty-one states, including Florida, have constitutional
provisions that guarantee the right to a judicial remedy either expressly or by
direct implication.162 The Connecticut Constitution, for example, provides that
“[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”163 In Michigan, by
contrast, the right to a remedy is directly implied by its constitutional guarantee
that “[a] suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute or defend his
suit, either in his own proper person or by an attorney.”164
The other nine states have constitutional provisions that guarantee some
“court-based rights,”165 and have recognized the right-remedy principle through

157

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
Canney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Alachua Cty., 278 So. 2d 260, 262 (Fla. 1973).
159 In re Alkire’s Estate, 198 So. 475, 482 (Fla. 1940) (Whitfield, J., supplemental
opinion).
160 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (emphases added).
161 Id.
162 Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age
of Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 978 & n.249, app. I
(2012).
163 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
164 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 13. Two state constitutions expressly limit the right to a remedy
to subjects, in the case of Massachusetts, a “subject of the commonwealth,” MASS. CONST.
pt. I, art. XI, and in New Hampshire’s case, a “subject of this state,” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art.
XIV, while Rhode Island and Vermont’s constitutions seem to limit the right to anyone
residing “within” the state, R.I. CONST. art I, § 5; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. IV.
165 See Resnik, supra note 162, at 978 n.249 (explaining that those states without express
judicial remedy language in their constitutions “have texts referencing other court-based
rights”).
158

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

2018]

STATE REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

427

constitutional construction or common lawmaking. California’s courts, for
example, have recognized a “right of access” to the courts “[i]n a variety of
contexts,” which includes the right to a judicial remedy for redress of wrongs.166
Hawai’i, the nation’s youngest state, has recognized, through judicial decision,
the entitlement of all “persons” to “redress for wrongs,” and the Constitution of
Alaska, the second-youngest state, also recognizes the importance of judicial
redress to realize legal rights.167
In Alaska and Hawai’i,168 as in every other state,169 courts of general
jurisdiction have common law authority to provide remedies to vindicate rights.
Courts of general jurisdiction presumptively have subject matter jurisdiction
necessary to provide relief for legal wrongs.170 As a matter of course, therefore,
state courts award damages for breaches of contract, enjoin nuisances that
interfere with an owner’s property rights, and redress tortious wrongs. State
courts also imply remedies for violations of statutory and constitutional law.
Private law has provided for redress of many of the wrongs that fall within
the general jurisdiction of state courts. State tort law in particular provides an
evolving system of law for redressing wrongs. Providing redress for tortious

166

See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State, 975 P.2d 622, 629 (Cal. 1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Payne v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 565, 568 (Cal. 1976)); Miller v.
R. K. A. Mgmt. Corp., 160 Cal. Rptr. 164, 169 (Ct. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1979) (“Free access
to the courts is an invaluable aspect of our system of jurisprudence.”).
167 Petersen v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Haw. 1969) (“[I]n general,
minor children are entitled to the same redress for wrongs done them as are any other
persons.” (citing Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 906 (N.H. 1930))); see also Patrick v. Lynden
Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 1988) (“We have construed the right to court
access under the Alaska Constitution to be an important right. In Bush [v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215,
1219 (Alaska 1973),] we recognized that a ‘legal right’ exists only so long as one may obtain
redress through the court system.”); Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666, 683 (Haw.
2008) (“Public policy requires that all persons shall [be able to] resort freely to the courts for
redress of wrongs and to enforce their rights” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Dickinson v. Echols, 578 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Ala. 1991))).
168 See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 3 (stating that “superior court shall be the trial court of
general jurisdiction”); In re Chow, 656 P.2d 105, 109-10 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that
“state circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and that jurisdiction extends to all
matters properly brought before them” (citing In re Keamo, 650 P.2d 1365, 1369-70 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1982))).
169 See State Court Caseload Statistics, Civil—Total Caseloads, COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT,
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx
[https://perma.cc/TT2S-H3SB] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018) (listing caseload statistics for
every state’s courts of general jurisdiction that was able to provide data).
170 For a typical discussion of a state court’s “general jurisdiction,” see Dubai Petroleum
Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (citing 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (1984); Bowles v. Angelo, 188 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945)).
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wrongs is a traditional state function that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the
states.171 Since the Founding, “the idea of a tort—a legally defined injurious
wrong for which the victim is entitled to an avenue of recourse”—has been “an
organizing concept” in state common law.172 For example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court made explicit the link between tort law and the right-remedy
principle. The Wisconsin Constitution provides that “[e]very person is entitled
to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive
in his person, property, or character.”173 The right-remedy principle, the court
explained, provides courts with the authority to develop the common law of tort
to redress wrongs in “new situations as the need [arises].”174
The right-remedy principle has not, however, ever been a guarantee of
personal redress for every wrong. Historically, the forms of pleading under state
law provided causes of action for judicial relief to vindicate rights.175 Whether
suing in law or equity, the victim of a wrong had to plead within the established
forms, which linked right and remedy in an indivisible whole.176 Together, the
common law and equity reflected the “aspiration of ubi jus, ibi remedium”177—
for every right, there is a remedy—but they did not guarantee legal relief for
every wrong.178 The common law “phrase ‘no writ-no right’” expressed “the
difficulties faced by those seeking relief” within the “highly technical . . .

171

See, e.g., Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Federal Product Liability Reform: A
Warning Not Heeded, 64 TENN. L. REV. 665, 679 (1997) (“As American jurisprudence
evolved, notions of state sovereignty gave vitality to the idea that tort law, substantially rooted
in the tradition of common law, should be left to the states.”).
172 John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law at the Founding, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 85, 105 (2011).
173 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9.
174 Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 45 (Wis. 1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Wis. 1962)). To be clear, our
arguments in Part III do not depend on the idea that tort law is the only way to satisfy “the
notion of giving individual redress to those who feel wronged.” Guido Calabresi, Civil
Recourse Theory’s Reductionism, 88 IND. L.J. 449, 467 (2013) (suggesting that aspiration of
providing remedies for rights might be satisfied “by letting victims participate in the criminal
adjudication and sentencing process”).
175 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 786
(2004) (explaining that “in America at the time of the Founding the existence of a cause of
action generally depended upon the availability of a remedy” and “[m]ost states had adopted
the common law of England and, with it, legal and equitable forms of proceeding”).
176 Id. at 784.
177 Id. at 792 (“To characterize the concept of the cause of action that appears to be most
legally germane at law and in equity as formal and remedies-based is not to deny the aspiration
of ubi jus, ibi remedium; it is merely to recognize the reality that the forms of proceeding at
law and in equity failed to fulfill it.”).
178 Id. at 784-86.
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minefield” of the common law forms of action.179 Moreover, some harms were
damnum absque injuria—that is, they did not give rise to a legal remedy.180
Over time, the forms of proceeding came to be seen as unnecessarily stringent,
poorly adapted to an increasingly complex world, and inadequate to ensure
remedies for new legal rights.181 Even though American law abandoned the
common law forms of proceeding, it maintained the aspiration to provide
personal remedies for legal rights. Some state courts have interpreted their
constitutional right-remedy provisions to provide a source of judicial power to
imply remedies, while others have concluded that the constitutional right to a
remedy precludes the legislature from abrogating particular rights to judicial
relief.182 Still other state courts have concluded the constitutional right-remedy
provision states an aspiration of state law but does not restrict legislative power
over the system of remedies.183 No state court thinks its law guarantees a
personal remedy for every legal wrong. Rather, providing law for the redress of
wrongs is a recognized state interest, even where countervailing concerns may
counsel withholding a remedy.184
2.

State Remedial Interests and Human Rights

Courts and commentators have doubted that the states have an interest in
providing remedies for international human rights. Judge Wilkinson, for
example, has suggested that the “constitutional entrustment of foreign affairs to
the national government” precludes any role for state tort law to be applied to
remedy human rights violations abroad.185 Scholars have argued that “[s]tate law

179

Barlow v. Sun Chem. Co., 838 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (citing Fiorini
v. Parkhurst, 100 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950)).
180 See, e.g., Platt v. Johnson & Root, 15 Johns. 213, 218-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) (citing
Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307, 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (opinion of Spencer, J.)).
181 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 945 (1987).
182 For an excellent overview of right-remedy clauses in state constitutions by a former
chief justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, see Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right
to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1335-39 (2003).
183 See Hawley v. Green, 788 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Idaho 1990) (holding that applicable state
statute of limitations did not violate Idaho constitutional provision regarding court remedies
and recognizing that the provision “does not prohibit the legislature from abolishing a
common law right of action without providing a substitution” (citing Twin Falls Clinic &
Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 644 P.2d 341, 346 (Idaho 1982))).
184 For an expression of this state interest in affording a remedy for redress of grievances,
see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
185 See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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is ill-fitting for human rights claims” and human rights litigation risks
undermining federalism principles.186
Yet the typical human rights claim in U.S. courts seeks to redress injuries that
fit comfortably within the right-remedy principle of state law. As Professor
Roger Alford has explained, nearly all human rights claims can be pled as torts,
which state law does not define by reference to citizenship or territorial
borders.187 In any given tort case, a judge “looks to whether an individual has
been injured by a wrong in a way that requires recourse”—and that is true even
of judges who think that tort law is not simply a law of private wrongs.188 The
question, in other words, is whether to provide a remedy for violation of a legal
right. As discussed, the aspiration to provide remedies for legal rights is a
fundamental one in every state’s law. That is one reason—some might say the
most important reason189—that all states provide legal remedies to redress
tortious wrongs.
The state interest in providing remedies for wrongs is reflected in the
transitory tort doctrine. This doctrine holds that a common law court may take
cognizance of a tort cause of action arising in another jurisdiction.190 Under the
U.S. Constitution, a state court has an obligation to adjudicate transitory causes
of action arising in other states.191 It is generally accepted that state courts have
jurisdiction over transitory torts arising abroad,192 on the theory that the tortious
wrong “gave rise to an obligation, an obligation, which, like other obligations,
follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.”193
186

Parrish, supra note 26, at 40; see also Childress III, supra note 11, at 753-57.
Alford, supra note 11, at 1091 (arguing that international human rights violations can
be “reframed” as “transnational torts” in part because “[w]ith common law tort claims, there
is no presumption against extraterritoriality”).
188 Calabresi, supra note 174, at 450-51.
189 Goldberg, supra note 35, at 596-605.
190 See, e.g., Dennick v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 11, 17 (1880) (applying transitory tort doctrine
and explaining that “when the act is done for which the law says the person shall be liable,
and the action by which the remedy is to be enforced is a personal and not a real action, and
is of that character which the law recognizes as transitory and not local, we cannot see why
the defendant may not be held liable in any court whose jurisdiction he can be subjected”).
See generally William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Fallacy, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 35, 39-42 (2010) (providing historical overview of
transitory tort doctrine).
191 See Weinberg, supra note 38, at 1509 (discussing Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613
(1951), and describing Court’s holding as being “that state courts of general jurisdiction are
under a constitutional duty to adjudicate a transitory cause of action arising in a sister state”).
192 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013)
(recognizing “common-law doctrine that allowed courts to assume jurisdiction over such
‘transitory torts,’ including actions for personal injury, arising abroad”).
193 Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). One explanation for
adjudicating transitory actions is to punish blameworthy defendants. This reason is only a
187
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The adjudication of transitory torts is not only consistent with, but also often
explained by, the right-remedy principle. Transitory torts are consistent with the
right-remedy principle by providing the victim of a legal wrong with a remedy
in any court having jurisdiction over the wrongdoer. State courts have explained
the doctrine in precisely these terms. In Mexican Central Railway Co. v.
Mitten,194 for example, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals traced the transitory
tort doctrine to the English tradition
of opening her courts to litigants who present themselves with their
grievances at their doors[, which] has been of the most liberal, enlightened,
and generous character. Not only is it the boast of the English people that
their courts are ever open to protect the rights and redress the wrongs of
those aggrieved by acts done within their own confines, but, with a few
simple conditions, the privilege is extended in all transitory actions, no
matter where the cause of action may have arisen. Under the wise and
beneficent operation of that system, except in certain cases, a remedy can
be found in English courts for torts committed in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of those courts.195
Other state courts have celebrated the “general rule of law that for the purpose
of redress it is immaterial where a tort was committed,”196 because “the personal
wrong to the plaintiff, for which she is entitled to redress, is transitory.”197
Here, as elsewhere, the right-remedy principle is not an absolute guarantee.
Under the common law doctrine, transitory torts cross territorial bounds, but
local actions do not. The obligatory citation is Livingston v. Jefferson,198 in

partial explanation at best; it matters that transitory torts entail a right to a remedy for the
victim of the wrong. And not all transitory actions necessarily involve punishing blameworthy
defendants; contract actions can be transitory.
194 36 S.W. 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
195 Id. at 283. In Armendiaz v. Stillman, 54 Tex. 623, 631 (1881), the Supreme Court of
Texas interpreted the transitory tort doctrine in light of the state’s constitutional guarantee of
a “remedy by due course of law” to “every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation.” Based upon that guarantee, it generously construed the doctrine,
concluding that “the fact that a more full and effectual redress might be afforded in the
jurisdiction where the wrong was done, or that the plaintiff must necessarily have greater
difficulty in making out his cause of action elsewhere, is no good ground to deny him all
chance of redress.” Id. at 632.
196 Myers v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 72 N.W. 694, 694 (Minn.
1897).
197 McIvor v. McCabe, 26 How. Pr. 257, 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863). Courts have also
expressed interest in redressing a transitory tort in terms of the defendant’s liability to the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Roberts v. Dunsuir, 16 P. 782, 782 (Cal. 1888) (“The action is transitory,
and the defendant may be sued wherever found; otherwise, a person might in some cases
escape such liability by simply going into another state.”).
198 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411).
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which Chief Justice Marshall, riding circuit, concurred with District Judge John
Tyler in holding that a federal court in Virginia lacked jurisdiction over a cause
of action for trespass arising in New Orleans.199 The trespass action was a local
action, and therefore had to be heard in a court where the land was located.200
Marshall doubted the “technical distinction,” at least on the facts of Livingston,
but concluded he was bound by precedent to apply it.201 That the author of
Marbury doubted the distinction should not come as a surprise. As Marshall
explained, courts had held that causes of action arising from “contracts
respecting lands” are transitory because “if the action be disallowed, the injured
party may have a clear right without a remedy.”202 In Marshall’s view, the rightremedy principle similarly called for the court to take cognizance of the trespass
action in Livingston, but precedent barred treating the action as transitory.203
Transitory actions thus implemented the right-remedy principle without
preventing “the inconvenience of a clear right without a remedy” in every
case.204
Some states have expanded the transitory tort doctrine in order to avoid the
“failure of justice” that Marshall identified.205 For example, some state courts
have rejected the rule that an action for damages to real property is necessarily
local.206 In 1896, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a cause of action for
damages to real property was transitory and thus triable in Minnesota though the

199

Id. at 662.
Id. at 662 (opinion of Tyler, J.) (stating that court “must have jurisdiction of every cause
it attempts to sustain” and finding courts cannot adjudicate “local actions” if the underlying
action did not occur in court’s district).
201 Id. at 663 (opinion of Marshall, J.) (“[B]ut for the loss of [a court’s jurisdiction] where
the remedy is against the person and can be afforded by the court, I have not yet discerned a
reason, other than a technical one, which can satisfy my judgment. If, however, this technical
distinction be firmly established, if all other judges respect it, I cannot venture to disregard
it.”).
202 Id.
203 See id. (noting distinction between local and transitory actions is “firmly established,”
but questioning validity of that distinction as ‘the jursidiction of the court depends on the
character of the parties”).
204 Id. at 665.
205 Id. (“Other judges . . . have struggled ineffectually against the distinction [between
local and transitory torts], which produces the inconvenience of a clear right without a
remedy.”).
206 Some states have altered the rule by legislation, and Congress recently abolished the
distinction between local and transitory actions for purposes of the general venue statute. See
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 202,
125 Stat. 758, 763-64 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391).
200
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land was located in another jurisdiction.207 “[W]e cannot see why the courts of
the present day should deem themselves slavishly bound,” the court reasoned,
by a rule that would leave a party with a “clear, legal right without a remedy.”208
It thus rejected the dissenting justice’s opinion that a nonresident should be left
without a remedy in Minnesota courts out of “comity” and because “[p]rotection
of our own citizens is the primary object and duty of our own courts.”209 The
Arkansas Supreme Court reached the same conclusion through interpreting its
constitution, which provided that “[e]very person is entitled to a certain remedy
in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he may receive in his person, property or
character.”210 Under this constitutional principle, “wrongs should not go
unredressed.”211 “If the [plaintiff] has been wronged he should have a remedy,”
the court reasoned; accordingly, it expanded the doctrine of transitory torts to
include a cause of action for damages to real property.212
With the transitory tort doctrine in mind, the common law history goes far to
confirm a state’s interest in providing remedies in most of the human rights cases
that find their way into American courts. The Tenth Amendment reserved to the
states their “primitive jurisdiction” over common law causes of action.213 The
common law forms provided remedies when an American citizen wronged a
foreign citizen in violation of the law of nations, whether on American soil or
abroad. Jurists, such as Emer de Vattel, also presumed that common law tort
actions would lie between foreign citizens within the United States and could

207

Little v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 67 N.W. 846, 847 (Minn. 1896)
(“An action for damages for injuries to real property is on principle just as transitory in its
nature as one on contract or for a tort committed on the person or personal property.”).
208 Id. at 847-48.
209 Id. at 849 (Buck, J., dissenting).
210 Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 249 S.W.2d 994, 996 (Ark. 1952) (quoting ARK. CONST.
art. 2, § 13).
211 Id.
212 Id. (rejecting majority rule from Livingston and allowing action on damage to real
property located in another state, remarking that “majority rule has no basis in logic or
equity”). While recognizing that the right-remedy principle undermined the common law
distinction between transitory torts and local actions involving injuries to real property, the
court had “some sympathy” for limiting transitory actions to personal torts “in international
disputes,” especially given the difficulty of determining land ownership under foreign law.
Id. (“[T]here is an understandable reluctance to subject one’s own citizens to suits by aliens,
especially if the other jurisdiction would provide no redress if the situation were reversed . . . .
One may have some sympathy for this position in international disputes, but it has no
persuasive effect when the States are involved.”).
213 See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 47-48, 51 (discussing Alexander Hamilton’s view in
Federalist 82 that “[a]s with other powers granted to the federal government in the
Constitution, states retained their ‘pre-existing’ or primitive authority”).
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reach “an alien-alien claim arising abroad [where] the defendant alien had
established domicile in the forum territory.”214
Some commentators argue that the transitory tort doctrine does not extend to
foreign-cubed cases—that is, cases where neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
is a U.S. resident and the wrong occurred outside U.S. territory. As Professors
Anthony Bellia and Bradford Clark point out, “common law judges and treatise
writers suggested that common law courts should not hear claims between
nonresident aliens for acts occurring abroad.”215 De Vattel’s influential treatise
reasoned that a court should not adjudicate a dispute between foreigners when
the alleged wrong took place in another country, unless the defendant was
domiciled in the forum state.216 His concern was directed towards respect for a
country’s territorial sovereignty.217 It does not seem, however, that this respect
for territorial sovereignty was an absolute bar to adjudication of a foreign-cubed
case. Professor Chimène Keitner has described two nineteenth-century New
York cases in which trial judges concluded that state courts could adjudicate
causes of action arising from wrongs occurring abroad between foreign citizens
who were not U.S. residents.218 Though a court could take jurisdiction, it should
do so only in an “exceptional” case where the defendant was “evad[ing] justice”
and the plaintiff had no alternative forum in which to seek a remedy.219 Keitner
rightly explains these cases in terms of a claimant’s interest in “meaningful
redress.”220 What is doing the normative work, in other words, is the rightremedy principle of state law.
Recognizing the right-remedy principle behind these common law forms
helps make clear why the history matters today. In some states, the state
constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every right may preclude the legislature
from repealing these common law rights of action.221 More generally, the right-

214 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of
Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 486 (2011).
215 Id. at 523.
216 Id. at 485-86 (explaining that Vattel’s reasoning “suggested that a judge should not hear
[a] case if he were in a place where the defendant was not domiciled or where the cause of
action did not arise”).
217 Id. at 486.
218 Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights
Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 85-86 (2013) (describing two cases between foreign parties
involving wrongs occurring outside United States which suggest “jurisdiction over transitory
tort claims exists, but that courts may, under certain circumstances, decline to exercise it”).
219 Id. at 86 (suggesting early opinions acknowledge courts’ jurisdiction over foreigncubed transitory torts but should exercise discretion in adjudicating those cases).
220 Id. at 82 (arguing that U.S. courts are “most justified in exercising jurisdiction” over
violations of “universally recognized prohibitions on conduct” when victim has no other
viable means of obtaining remedy where injury occurred).
221 See Phillips, supra note 182, at 1337.
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remedy principle confirms that states have a constitutionally recognized interest
in providing redress, including for transitory wrongs.
Nothing in what we have argued thus far proves that states are required to
provide remedies for every human rights case within their constitutional
cognizance. Some states are wary of reaching foreign-cubed cases. Florida’s
Supreme Court, for example, has held that its constitutional provision requires
an accommodation between the right to a remedy and the potential limits on
transnational litigation.222 The constitutional right-remedy provision is not “a
limitless warrant to bring the world’s litigation [to Florida’s courts],” because
“[t]he use of Florida courts to police activities even in the remotest parts of the
globe is not a purpose for which our judiciary was created.”223 Therefore,
Florida’s right-remedy principle does not bar a Florida court from dismissing
transnational litigation based upon the forum non conveniens defense in some
cases. At the same time, in light of “the obvious purpose underlying article I,
section 21[, which] is to guarantee access to a potential remedy for wrongs,” a
Florida court analyzing that defense must assure itself “that remedies are
available in convenient alternative fora with better connections to the events
complained of.”224 Applying this framework, Florida courts have dismissed tort
actions involving non-U.S. parties and foreign conduct in favor of a more
convenient forum, but they have also heard these types of cases “where the
adequacy of the alternative forum is uncertain.”225 Other states strike the balance
differently; for our purposes in this Part, it is enough to argue that states have
recognized—and should recognize—the state interest in providing law for
redress of wrongs in human rights cases.
Redressing human rights violations hits upon the basic remedial functions of
state courts. The demand for an individual remedy is intuitive in most human
rights cases under state law. Prisoners who were beaten, electrocuted, and
otherwise abused by private contractors at a military prison;226 villagers who
were forced to labor and falsely imprisoned during the construction of a natural
gas pipeline;227 and the families of children who were subjected to medical

222

Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86, 93 (Fla. 1996).
Id. at 92-93.
224 Id. at 93.
225 Publicidad Vepaco, C.A. v. Mezerhane, 176 So. 3d 273, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(applying four-step federal standard for addressing forum non conveniens challenges adopted
by Florida courts in Kinney, and finding Florida courts to be appropriate fora for foreign
wrongs at issue).
226 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Garland, J., dissenting) (arguing
alleged severe human rights violations are actionable under ATS, noting there is “no warrant
for displacing ordinary operation of state law and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaints solely on
preemption grounds”).
227 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding, inter alia,
“that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate immunity for torts
223
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experiments without their informed consent228 each have a compelling demand
for a remedy to redress the violations of their human rights. To decide whether
to meet that demand requires analysis of the underlying rights, the remedies the
plaintiffs seek, and the limits on judicial competence to afford relief—all legal
questions that state courts routinely answer.
B.

Federal Law

Federal law recognizes state authority to provide remedies for wrongs,
including remedies for human rights violations. As this Section explains, within
the American federal system, state courts bear most of the load of providing law
for the redress of wrongs. The states’ constitutionally recognized interest in
remedying the violations of legal rights extends to violations of international
human rights. Our structural constitutional argument is, in a nutshell, that
“federalism abhors a remedial vacuum,” and not just in cases involving
American constitutional law, but also in human rights law.229
A starting point for our argument is Article III itself, which authorizes but
does not require Congress to create lower federal courts.230 Under the terms of
the Madisonian Compromise, reached by the Framers at the Philadelphia
Convention, Congress could have declined to create lower federal courts to hear
federal claims.231 Thus, the Framers assumed the possibility that state courts
would have authority to do most of the work of providing law and fora for
redressing federal law violations.232 And, at the same time the Framers
contemplated that states could adjudicate federal claims, they also included the
Supremacy Clause, and made treaties “the supreme Law of the Land,”233
suggesting the Framers presumed state courts could provide law and fora for the

based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of
nations”).
228 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that customary
prohibition in international law against “nonconsensual human medical experimentation” can
be enforced through ATS).
229 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1505 (1987)
(arguing that structure of federalism provides “mechanism of overlapping remedies for
constitutional wrongs” by allowing federal government to furnish “supplemental remed[ies]”
to those provided by state courts).
230 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”).
231 See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 745-46 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
232 See id. at 746 (“The assumption that state courts would continue to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over federal claims was essential to this compromise.”).
233 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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redress of violations of international law as well.234 We think, therefore, that our
basic argument—that states may provide law and courts for the redress of
violations of human rights, particularly when the causes of action arise under
state law or foreign tort law—is consistent with the Framers’ presumptions
regarding state authority to provide courts of general jurisdiction.
1.

Federal Recognition of a State’s Interest in Providing Remedies

Federal law itself recognizes the right to a remedy. The U.S. Constitution does
not expressly guarantee this right.235 It is generally acknowledged, however, that
federal constitutional law aspires to provide personal remedies for violations of
constitutional rights.236 Marbury, of course, provides an early statement of the
right-remedy principle—though Marbury is also an example of jurisdictional
limits on that principle.237 The right-remedy principle has underwritten key
doctrines of constitutional remedies, including in Ex parte Young, which implied
a right of action for injunctive relief from violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment,238 and in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, which implied a damages remedy directly from the Fourth
Amendment.239 The right-remedy principle has also been the basis for implied
private rights of action to enforce federal statutes.240
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have retreated from the right-remedy
principle under federal law. However, they have explicitly left to state law a
primary role in providing remedies for federal rights. For example, in Minneci
v. Pollard,241 the Court declined to imply a Bivens remedy under the Eighth
Amendment in light of an available remedy against the defendants under state
tort law.242 As the Minneci Court explained, state tort law provided an “adequate

234 Ernest A. Young, Sorting out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 365, 426 (2002).
235 The two exceptions are the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, which requires “just
compensation” for the taking of private property, and the Suspension Clause, which sets out
the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
236 See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289, 303-11 (1995).
237 Having recognized that Marbury could claim a right to a remedy under the writ of
mandamus, the Supreme Court denied him judicial relief on the ground that it lacked
jurisdiction under the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)
(“The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial
courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be
warranted by the constitution.”).
238 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908).
239 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
240 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
241 565 U.S. 118 (2012).
242 Id. at 126.
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‘alternative, existing [remedial] process.’”243 Under Minneci, a federal court
should refrain from implying a damages remedy where “traditional state tort
law” provides a remedy that will vindicate the underlying federal constitutional
right.244 The primary justification for the retreat from implied rights of action
under federal law, as Justice Antonin Scalia noted in his concurring opinion in
Sosa, is that “federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law
courts.”245 Accordingly, Justice Scalia recognized the authority of state courts
“to develop and apply their own rules of decision” regarding rights and
remedies.246
The doctrinal implications of this structural principle are powerful. Federal
law treats a state’s interest in providing law for the redress of wrongs as an
important factor in analyzing federal limits on state law. Several examples
should prove the point. Personal jurisdiction doctrine affirms a state’s “manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents.”247 This interest
goes to the reasonableness, under the Due Process Clause, of a state’s exercise
of jurisdiction over a defendant.248 First Amendment doctrine recognizes a
state’s “legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury,” which requires an
“accommodation” between constitutional limits on civil liability for speech and
the demand for redress of wrongs.249 Federal labor law similarly recognizes an
“overriding state interest” in remedying injuries arising from libelous speech,
which “vitiates the ordinary arguments for pre-emption” where federal law does
not “provide redress to the maligned party.”250
243

Id.
Id. at 119. State remedies have become all the more important following Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), which seems to cut back significantly on Bivens remedies
under federal law. In Abbasi, the Court cited Minneci in denying a Bivens remedy on several
grounds, including the availability of what it saw as alternative and more effective forms of
relief. Id. at 1857.
245 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981)); see
also Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856 (“[I]t is a significant step under separation-of-powers
principles for a court to determine that it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create
and enforce a cause of action for damages against federal officials . . . .”).
246 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
247 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that finding that state
court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant insurance company would place great
burden on state residents because they would be forced to litigate in possibly distant state).
248 See, e.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985).
249 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1974) (discussing careful balance
of First Amendment rights of press with state common law tort claims); see also Seth Davis,
Equal Sovereignty as a Right Against a Remedy, 76 LA. L. REV. 83, 92-103 (2015) (describing
how state’s interest in providing system for redress of wrongs arises in due process, First
Amendment, and equal protection jurisprudence).
250 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63-64 (1966).
244
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More generally, the Supreme Court has explained that it “rel[ies] on the
presumption [against preemption]” of state tort law “because respect for the
States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system’ leads us to assume that
‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.’”251 The
possibility that state tort suits might complement federal regulation by detecting
and deterring violations of law is one reason to employ the presumption against
preemption. Another is that “[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would . . .
remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”252
As the Court recently put it, “[n]o such design can be attributed to a rational
Congress.”253
In short, within our federal system, state courts and state law are guarantors
of redress of legal wrongs. This feature of U.S. federalism follows from the
Framers’ decision to limit jurisdiction of the federal courts to particular “[c]ases”
and “[c]ontroversies.” In the absence of a “valid excuse,” the U.S. Constitution
requires state courts to adjudicate federal claims.254 And, as the Court held in
Claflin v. Houseman,255 state courts presumptively have concurrent jurisdiction
over claims arising under federal law.256 Thus, the Constitution, in most cases,
leaves state courts free to exercise whatever jurisdiction they have under state
law, even when that jurisdiction allows them to provide remedies in cases that
also fall within federal jurisdiction.

251

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 n.3 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
252 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
253 Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1781 (2013). We do not,
however, want to overstate the point. In recent years, the Court has given less weight to a
state’s interest in providing redress for wrongs. As Professor Gillian Metzger put it, “this
consideration was lacking in recent preemption decisions.” Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism
and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 (2011) (discussing recent shift in
Supreme Court jurisprudence where Court found no preemption for state tort claims not
because of concerns over preserving injured plaintiff’s access to compensation, but as way to
supplement federal regulation by identifying areas where regulators and Congress could focus
their efforts). Several decisions have treated state tort law as simply a way of regulating
behavior, ignoring or downplaying its remedial function, and found that federal regulatory
law preempted tort remedies. For a critique of these decisions that emphasizes a state’s interest
in redressing wrongs, see Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s
Theory of Private Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1157-58 (2013).
254 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947) (rejecting argument that State’s policy
against enforcement by its courts of statutes from other states and from federal government is
sufficient to deny plaintiff’s state law claims).
255 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
256 Id. at 134.
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Judicial Federalism and International Human Rights

A state’s interest in remedying a legal wrong is not diminished merely
because the wrong happens to be a human rights violation. The U.S. Constitution
does not expressly prohibit states from providing remedies for human rights
violations, even when the parties are foreign and the wrongs occurred abroad.257
To the contrary, there is evidence that the Constitution was understood to
recognize the remedial authority of states even when the parties, relevant
occurrences, or applicable law were foreign. For instance, when adopting the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction in Claflin, the Court quoted Alexander
Hamilton in Federalist No. 82: “The judiciary power of every government looks
beyond its own local or municipal laws and, in civil cases, lays hold of all
subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of
dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe.”258 As
Hamilton had it, the laws of “Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the
objects of legal discussion to our courts.”259 In a sense, then, we are not treading
new ground: Hamilton’s “classic”260 statement of judicial federalism lends
support to a state’s constitutionally recognized interest in remedying transitory
legal wrongs wherever they may arise.261
In transnational cases not involving human rights violations, the Supreme
Court has recognized that a state’s constitutional interest in remedying wrongs
may apply and that analysis of limits on state remedies must take this interest

257 Instead, it expressly prohibits states from “enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance or
Confederation,” “grant[ing] Letters of Marque or Reprisal,” “lay[ing] any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports,” “keep[ing] Troops or Ships of War in time of Peace,” “enter[ing] into
any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power,” and “engag[ing] in War, unless
actually invaded.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. States may engage in some of those activities with
congressional consent. Id. Congress has the power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations,” id. § 8, cl. 10, but this
delegation does not exclude the states from “providing for the punishment of the same thing,”
United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887). See generally Ross J. Corbett, Kiobel,
Bauman, and the Presumption Against the Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort
Statute, 13 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 50 (2015). The clause delegating to Congress the power to
define “Offences against the Law of Nations” grew out of a recommendation to the states,
drafted by Edmund Randolph, that called upon them to exercise their authority to provide for
the punishment of violations of international law and to create private rights of action for
damages. The Framers, concerned that the states would not do so, decided “to give Congress
the authority to ensure compliance with international law.” Sarah H. Cleveland & William S.
Dodge, Defining and Punishing Offenses Under Treaties, 124 YALE L.J. 2202, 2232 (2015).
258 Claflin, 93 U.S. at 138.
259 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 (1990).
260 Id. at 368.
261 See Alice H. Henkin, The Influence of International Human Rights on State Courts and
State Constitutions, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 259, 259 (1996).
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into account. For example, in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,262 the Supreme
Court held that federal forum non conveniens principles did not foreclose Texas
from adjudicating a transnational dispute under Singaporean law.263 The Court
highlighted two distinctions between federal and state law: first, the Texas
Constitution guarantees a remedy to redress wrongs, and, second, Texas has an
“open-courts” statute that applied to the dispute.264 Given state law’s recognition
of the right-remedy principle, the Court reasoned, federal forum non conveniens
law “simply [could not] determine whether” the state courts would be “an
appropriate forum.”265 Mining the same vein, state courts have held that
constitutional or statutory right-remedy and open-courts principles may trump,
or at least limit and guide the interpretation of, forum non conveniens
defenses.266 In other words, there are some transnational cases in which a state’s

262

486 U.S. 140 (1988).
Id. at 148-49.
264 Id. at 148 (first citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; then citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 71.031 (1986)).
265 Id.
266 See Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990). Alfaro was superseded by
the legislature, which made the forum non conveniens defense available. See Act of Feb. 23,
1993, ch. 4, § 1, 1993 TEX. GEN. LAWS 10 (codified as amended at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 71.051) (repealed in part by Act of June 2, 2003, ch. 204, § 3.09, 2003 TEX.
GEN. LAWS 847, 855). Other state courts have concluded that the right-remedy principle
should be considered in applying forum non conveniens. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Lohn, 557 P.2d 373, 373 (Colo. 1976) (“Cogent opinions construing similar provisions in the
South Carolina and Georgia constitutions lead us to the conclusion that a provision such as
[the Colorado open-court rule] limits very stringently the power to exclude resident plaintiffs
from our court system where jurisdiction has otherwise been properly established.”); Sabino
v. Ruffolo, 562 A.2d 1134, 1136 (Conn. App. 1989) (“State courts . . . have jurisdiction over
all types of cases except those few that congress or the constitution have specifically removed
from their jurisdiction. Therefore, states bear the ultimate responsibility for providing their
citizens with a forum in which to resolve their differences.” (citations omitted)); Taylor v. LSI
Logic Corp., 689 A.2d 1196, 1201 n.18 (Del. 1997); Chapman v. S. Ry. Co., 95 S.E.2d 170,
173 (S.C. 1956) (“Under the 1895 Constitution of South Carolina, Article I, § 15, it is provided
that ‘All Courts shall be public, and every person shall have speedy remedy therein for wrongs
sustained . . .’ [W]hen a resident of this state sues a foreign corporation upon a transitory
cause of action . . . it would not be consistent with sound public policy to deny such resident
access to the courts of this state . . . .”); Summa Corp. v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 559 P.2d 544,
546 (Utah 1977) (“There is no provision in our statutes or our rules of procedure expressly
authorizing the dismissal of an action on the basis of forum non conveniens. However, as part
of the inherent power that our district courts have . . . they undoubtedly could refuse to
exercise jurisdiction if convinced that it would place an unreasonable burden upon some or
all of the parties, or upon the court . . . .”); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law:
Does the Common Law Apply Abroad?, 102 GEO. L.J. 301, 338 (2014) (explaining that
handful of state legislatures have expressly directed their courts to adjudicate foreign actions).
263
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interest in providing remedies for violations of rights confirms that the state’s
courts are an appropriate forum.
Constitutional recognition of a state’s remedial authority distinguishes state
and federal courts with respect to remedies for human rights. The history of the
ATS shows that the United States has long viewed there to be some form of right
to a remedy under international law267 and that states have the authority—and
perhaps even a responsibility—to provide that remedy with respect to claims by
non-citizens.268
One of the ATS’s original purposes was to fulfill U.S. obligations under
international law by allowing a non-citizen to seek redress in a federal forum.269
There are a host of competing accounts of the ATS’s history, but many find
common ground in the right-remedy principle. Anne-Marie Slaughter has
argued that Congress adopted the ATS in order to fulfill a “general obligation to
help redress certain violations of international law as such,” an obligation that
“flowed not to other states individually, but to the community of civilized
nations.”270 Professor William Casto also argues for a “liberal” construction of
the statute, reasoning that it created a form of protective jurisdiction allowing
domestic courts to “create a domestic damage remedy to give meaning to an
individual right created by international law.”271 Professor Thomas Lee has
argued that the ATS was designed to provide aliens with a federal forum to
redress “transgressions of safe conducts”—i.e., “a noncontract injury to an
alien’s person or property”—in light of the United States’ international legal
obligation to provide a remedy for this type of wrong.272 Bellia and Clark also
look to the United States’ international obligations to remedy wrongs,
concluding that the ATS gave aliens a “right to sue Americans in federal court
for torts that, if not redressed . . ., would render the United States responsible for
its citizens’ violations of the law of nations.”273 Though the details vary, these
competing accounts share the view that the ATS was “adopted . . . because of
the longstanding recognition in Anglo-American law, and international law, of

267

See infra Section II.C (discussing right to remedy under international law).
Another statutory example of federal recognition of remedial rights for international
wrongs is the Torture Victims Protection Act. See William R. Casto, The ATS Cause of Action
Is Sui Generis, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1545, 1564 (2014) (discussing TVPA as evidence
that “Congress has championed the concept of an international tort action”).
269 See generally HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 113.
270 Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 464 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
271 William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed
in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 482 (1986).
272 Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 830, 836-37 (2006).
273 Bellia & Clark, supra note 214, at 450.
268
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the importance attached to a government’s performance of its obligation to
provide recourse to victims of wrongs.”274
When enacting the ATS, Congress assumed that state courts had authority to
satisfy the nation’s obligations by providing remedies for violations of
international law, including in cases that might not fall within ATS jurisdiction.
As originally enacted, the ATS stated that federal district courts had jurisdiction
“concurrent with the courts of the several States.”275 Congress enacted the ATS
because it was concerned states had not, and would not, exercise their authority
to redress wrongs against aliens, thus potentially leading the United States to
violate its obligations under international law.276 But neither the First Congress
nor any subsequent Congress has ousted state courts of their concurrent
jurisdiction over ATS cases. If anything, as Bellia and Clark suggest, the First
Congress expected that state courts were “available to hear” not only ATS cases,
but also tort suits involving aliens that might not fall within the ATS’s ambit.277
Then, as now, state tort law “supplie[d] an important means” of remedying torts
in violation of international law.278
If one reason for the ATS was to ensure that if states did not remedy a wrong
against a foreign citizen in violation of international law, federal courts would
be empowered to do so, then it would make little sense to limit the ability of
states to perform this remedial function now that the federal courts are retreating
from this role after Kiobel. Furthermore, the reasons for the Supreme Court’s
retrenchment from ATS litigation follow in part from two features that are
peculiar to federal courts and not applicable to state courts. First, federal courts
presume that Congress does not intend them to apply federal statutes
extraterritorially, and Kiobel applied that presumption.279 But nothing in the U.S.
Constitution, nor in most states’ laws, requires state courts to apply a strong
presumption against extraterritoriality.280 Second, and more important, federal

274

Goldberg, supra note 172, at 97.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 78. In subsequent amendments, Congress
dropped this text, which has become unnecessary in light of the background constitutional
principle that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal cases. See supra notes
254-60 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
277 Bellia & Clark, supra note 214, at 450; see also id. at 520.
278 Id. at 545.
279 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013).
280 Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92
B.U. L. REV. 535, 563 (2012) (“What should we make of the fact that, in many areas of law,
state law is more likely than federal law to be applied outside the United States?”); see also
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 203 reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017) (“The presumption against extraterritoriality is a
presumption about the intent of Congress and therefore applies only to federal statutes . . . .
275
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courts presume that they are not competent to provide damages remedies for
violations of statutory and international law unless Congress has specifically
authorized it.281 This presumption does not apply to state courts, which have
general jurisdiction to redress wrongs. Moreover, state and federal constitutional
law recognizes and affirms the state interest in providing remedies for wrongs.282
C.

International Law

A third foundation for the right-remedy principle is international law.
Generally, international law contains “conduct-regulating rules that are
translated into ‘causes of action’ by domestic legal systems and international
courts.”283 At the time of the Founding, the right-remedy principle was a feature
of international law in the sense that a nation had, at a minimum, an obligation
to provide redress when one of its citizens committed certain torts against a
foreign citizen.284 Today, the right-remedy principle under international law is
evolving in a different direction, such that “[t]he obligation to provide effective
remedies is an essential component of international human rights law.”285 We
do not argue that international law necessarily imposes a binding legal obligation
on the United States to provide remedies for violations of human rights. Rather,
we argue that the right to a remedy under international law provides an
independent justification for the states’ interest in remedying human rights.
1.

Treaties

Several major multilateral treaties embody a right-remedy principle. As
Professor Beth Stephens has catalogued, the International Covenant on Civil and

Subject to constraints imposed by federal law, the geographic scope of State statutes is a
question of State law . . . . Some States have adopted their own State presumptions against
extraterritoriality.”). See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Determining the Territorial Scope
of State Law in Interstate and International Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement
(Third) and on the Role of Party Autonomy, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381, 385-89 (2017).
281 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (citing Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
282 See supra Part I.
283 Keitner, supra note 218, at 91.
284 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 214, at 449 (“The First Congress was undoubtedly aware
of [the principles of liability for international torts] and enacted several statutory provisions—
including the ATS—in order to comply with the United States’ obligations under the law of
nations . . . .”).
285 SHELTON, supra note 39, at 85.
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Political Rights (“ICCPR”),286 the American Convention on Human Rights,287
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,288 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,289 to name some prominent examples, require states to provide
an effective remedy for violation of the human rights they protect.290 The right
to a remedy also finds expression in international investment law. As Professor
Sergio Puig has discussed, international investment arbitration under the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
Convention established a right to a remedy in “response to calls for access to
effective justice.”291
The right to a remedy embodied in these and other treaties is not necessarily
enforceable in U.S. courts. For one thing, it is not certain that these rights are
extraterritorial. There is ongoing debate, for example, about whether the ICCPR
has extraterritorial scope.292 Thus, a human rights treaty might not directly
support state remedies for human rights violations by a party to the treaty that
occurred outside the party’s territory.293 For another, there are domestic law

286 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (stating duties that each party to covenant must undertake,
including “ensur[ing] that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy”).
287 American Convention on Human Rights art. 8(1), opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force July 18,
1978).
288 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
289 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 7, opened for
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
290 Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis
of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4647 (2002).
291 Sergio Puig, No Right Without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State Arbitration,
35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 829, 841 (2014).
292 See, e.g., Aldo S. Zilli, Note, Approaching the Extraterritoriality Debate: The Human
Rights Committee, the U.S. and the ICCPR, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 399, 401 (2011) (“The
United States, along with other state parties, argue that the plain meaning of the language
shows that the ICCPR only applies within a state’s territory.”). For a thorough discussion of
the issue of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, see generally Oona A.
Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply
Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (2011).
293 On the other hand, the right to a remedy is distinct from the human right that has been
violated in the first instance for which a remedy is sought. If a person seeks a remedy in a
given territory, no extraterritorial application of the right to a remedy is necessary to obligate
a court there to provide a remedy, even if the human rights violation for which the remedy is
sought occurred outside that territory.
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limits on a court’s authority to imply domestic remedies from international
treaties.294 Even if not directly enforceable, however, human rights treaties
provide normative support for state remedies when human rights protected by
those treaties are violated. When the United States is a party to the relevant
treaty, the foundation for state remedies may be even stronger. Indeed, the
understanding of the United States regarding some human rights treaties,
including the ICCPR, is that the federal government has limited responsibility
and state and local governments have primary responsibility for implementing
treaty obligations.295 Moreover, the existence of major multilateral
commitments to provide redress for human rights violations helps to confirm the
validity of a state’s interest in remedies for those violations.
2.

Customary International Law

Customary international law (“CIL”) also supports a state’s interest in
providing remedies for human rights. CIL recognizes a right to a remedy for at
least some human rights violations. In particular, CIL recognizes a right to a
remedy for “gross” violations of international human rights law and “serious”
violations of international humanitarian law.
The U.N. General Assembly recognized this remedial right in its non-binding
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy (the “Principles”),
which the United States joined in adopting.296 In particular, the Principles state:
A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a
serious violation of international humanitarian law shall have equal access
to an effective judicial remedy as provided for under international law. . . .
Obligations arising under international law to secure the right to access
justice and fair and impartial proceedings shall be reflected in domestic
laws.297

294

See infra Section III.B.4.
See S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 23 (1992) (“[T]he United States understands that this
Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises
legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the
state and local governments.”); David Kaye, State Execution of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 95, 104-10 (2013) (discussing legislative
history of ICCPR and Congress’s concerns of maintaining federalism).
296 G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005).
297 Id.; see also William J. Aceves, Litigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict in U.S. Courts:
Critiquing the Lawfare Critique, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 313, 318 (2010) (“[T]he central
purpose of any legal system is to offer a viable alternative to the use of force and a mechanism
for victims to seek redress for their injuries.”). But cf. Katharine Shirey, The Duty to
Compensate Victims of Torture Under Customary International Law, 14 INT’L LEGAL PERSP.
295
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The Principles do not define the especially serious human rights violations that
trigger an obligation to provide individual redress, but they comfortably include
many wrongs alleged in human rights suits in American courts, such as torture,
disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.298
International law has also begun to recognize a broader “right to court access,
[which,] whether or not it has become a legally binding rule of international law,
is widely accepted and increasingly legalized.”299 Like the right to a remedy, this
international norm provides a basis for a state’s interest in adjudicating foreign
suits.300 To the extent that the United States has an obligation under international
law to provide redress—a question that we need not answer here—state courts
may be required to implement that obligation. Even if there is no such obligation,
the right to a remedy under CIL affirms the legitimacy of the state interest in
redressing human rights violations.
D.

Political Theory

Political theory also supports the state interest in providing remedies for
human rights. The principle that rights imply remedies is a longstanding
principle of political morality reflected in positive law. In addition, several
different traditions in political theory point toward a right-remedy principle that
does not turn on the place of the alleged human rights abuse or the nationality of
the victim. Nor do these theories have any less normative force for state remedies
than for federal remedies.
1.

Corrective Justice

Corrective justice theory is one theoretical basis. The corrective justice ideal
aims to remedy relational wrongs between a victim and a tortfeasor.301 The rightremedy principle is an expression of this ideal. Understood in terms of corrective
justice, the right-remedy principle recognizes the ideal of ordering a wrongdoer

30, 38 (2004) (“The acceptance of a substantive human right as customary international law
does not automatically carry with it the individual victim’s right to a remedy.”).
298 See, e.g., HILDE HEY, GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A SEARCH FOR CAUSES 18
(1995).
299 Whytock, supra note 3, at 2048.
300 See id. at 2059; see also Stephens, supra note 290, at 49 (arguing that right-remedy
“principles [under conventional and CIL] support the conclusion that states at the very least
are permitted to offer civil remedies for violations of international law, no matter where those
abuses took place” (emphasis added)).
301 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
273, 275 (2011) (“Long ago Learned Hand formulated this relationship as a truism when he
characterized a remedy as ‘an obligation destined to stand in the place of the plaintiff’s rights,
and be, as nearly as possible, an equivalent to him for his rights.’” (citing Learned Hand,
Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARV. L. REV. 249, 255 (1897))).
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to correct a loss by compensating the victim.302 This ideal may support private
remedies against a wrongdoer wherever she may be found because it depends
on the existence of a wrongdoer-victim relationship, not on any particular
territorial connections.
Corrective justice supplies an attractive account of state remedies for human
rights violations for several reasons. First, it has a tether to positive law—the
law of torts.303 Second, the wrongs alleged in most human rights litigation in
domestic courts fit within the relational model of corrective justice. Because they
generally entail claims by individual victims against alleged wrongdoers who
are individuals or business entities, they do not run into the standard objection
that corrective justice is a poor fit for international justice because countries
cannot be treated as moral agents.304 And, because international law and
international legal institutions remain comparatively “incapable of supplying
corrective justice,”305 state remedies have an important role to play in realizing
the ideals of corrective justice.
2.

Social Contract Theory: Contracts Among Nations and Among People

John Locke rooted the right to a remedy in the social contract, which obliges
the government to provide for redress of wrongs.306 Understood in civil recourse
terms, the right-remedy principle empowers a victim to seek judicial recourse
against the wrongdoer. Empowering victims with private rights of action fulfills
the government’s obligation under the social contract. The government has
assumed a political duty to provide victims of legal wrongs, who have
surrendered their natural right to self-help, with a means of recourse against
those who wronged them.307

302

See Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014).
See Louis E. Wolcher, The Paradox of Remedies: The Case of International Human
Rights Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 515, 524 (2000) (“[C]orrective justice is the
traditional philosophy of remedial justice within the international legal system.”); cf. James
F. Moseley, Overview of American Justice, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1725, 1747 (2001).
304 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J.
1565, 1592 (2008) (arguing that “the climate change problem poorly fits the corrective justice
model because the consequence of tort-like thinking would be to force many people who have
not acted wrongfully to provide a remedy to many people who have not been victimized”).
305 Lea Brilmayer, International Justice and International Law, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 635,
641 (1996).
306 As Locke put it, “he who has suffered the damage has a Right to demand in his own
name, and he alone can remit.” JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 273-74 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).
307 See Andrew S. Gold, The Taxonomy of Civil Recourse, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 65, 7071 (2011); Goldberg, supra note 35, at 550-51 (characterizing private rights of action and
civil recourse as legitimately held moral enforcement rights).
303
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A social-contract account of the right-remedy principle has purchase in
domestic litigation. It explains why one citizen may call upon the judicial
machinery for redress against another. On this theory, tort law, for example,
ensures that citizens are equally accountable to one another for private wrongs.
Private rights of action allow a tort victim the legal right to decide whether to
bring the wrongdoer to account.
Extending social contract theory to international law may help explain the
normative force of the right-remedy principle in international human rights
cases. At first glance, human rights and remedies might appear inconsistent with
social contract theory.308 One view of social contract theory posits countries as
parties to an international social contract.309 On this view, individual remedies
for international human rights violations are derivative of the social contract
among countries. The chief difficulty of this view is that it cannot easily explain
why countries—which vary widely in economic, military, and political power,
not to mention living conditions—would consent to a system of universal human
rights and remedies that limits their sovereignty. But there is another view of
social contract theory that treats individuals as parties to a global social contract
that transcends nation-states.310 This view need not entail a single world
government and global citizenship, but it does hold that the international
system’s raison d’être is to instantiate fundamental principles of justice among
individuals. While such a system might direct individual citizens to appeal first
to their own governments to protect their human rights, it would not bar them
from seeking redress from foreign courts where necessary to remedy human
rights violations.
3.

Cosmopolitan Theory

This latter conception of the international social contract bears more than a
passing resemblance to cosmopolitan theory. Cosmopolitanism provides a
308 See Zachary Mills, Note, Does the World Need Knights Errant to Combat Enemies of
All Mankind? Universal Jurisdiction, Connecting Links, and Civil Liability, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1315, 1351 (2009) (“Unlimited jurisdiction flies in the face of the social contract
theory of government, and any academic suggestions that international law affirmatively
supports a norm of unlimited jurisdiction, and thus supersedes democracy and the social
contract, are merely wishful thinking.”); cf. David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against
Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 125 (2004) (“[S]ocial contract theory is unable to explain
why states should choose a system of international law that protects human rights in other
states.”).
309 See David Singh Grewal, Essay, The Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes on
International Order, 125 YALE L.J. 618, 626 (2016) (discussing that some have postulated
necessity of Hobbesian social contract among states in order to achieve international order).
310 See, e.g., DARREN J. O’BYRNE, THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP: POLITICAL
IDENTITY BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 123 (2003) (explaining this view where “global
citizens” are “bound up within a wider recognition of their role as individuals living on a
single globe”).
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foundation for state remedies for human rights, including in foreign-cubed cases.
Cosmopolitan moral theory claims that humans have a duty to aid fellow
humans, regardless of nationality.311 This duty may arise, as Professor Martha
Nussbaum has argued, from focusing upon what human dignity requires of all
of us.312 She derives the idea of human rights from human dignity, which
“requires many things from the world: adequate nutrition, education of the
faculties, protection of bodily integrity, liberty for speech and religious selfexpression, and so forth.”313 We have rights to these goods because they are
necessary for a life of basic dignity. These rights create duties that bind all of us:
“Humanity is under a collective obligation to find ways of living and cooperating together so that all human begins have decent lives.”314 This way of
living together can be “respectful of cultural difference” by looking to nationstates to implement our collective obligations.315
Cosmopolitanism might seem to entail a “radical”316 view of universal
jurisdiction in which any domestic court can at any time take cognizance of any
human rights violations arising anywhere. But this view is not necessary to our
argument, which, following Professor Noah Feldman, might rest on the more
“minimalist” conception that the global system of remedies for human rights
violations must preclude a “legal vacuum.”317 In other words, cosmopolitanism
need entail only the view that states have a legal interest—and perhaps a moral
duty—in “expanding” remedies for human rights to fill enforcement “gap[s]”
that create, either formally or in practice, “law-free zone[s].”318 At a minimum,
cosmopolitan theory suggests that “[e]ven if the Constitution does not require a
law for the redress of wrongs, providing such a law surely counts as an important
state interest” in human rights cases.319
E.

The Limits of the Aspiration to Provide Law for the Redress of Wrongs

There is, in short, both a positive-law and a political-theory foundation for a
state’s authority and interest in providing law for the redress of violations of
311 See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1851 (2009) (noting that many
cosmopolitan theorists “argue that international morality (and therefore, ideally, international
law) imposes a duty on nations to act to help peoples in other states and enhance global
welfare, regardless of domestic political preferences”).
312 Martha C. Nussbaum, Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global Justice, 32
OXFORD DEV. STUD. 13 (2004).
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1065 (2007).
317 See id. at 1066-67.
318 Id. at 1067.
319 Cf. Oman & Solomon, supra note 253, at 1157.
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human rights. But state authority to provide such law is limited by countervailing
concerns. The aspiration to provide law for the redress of wrongs is not a
guarantee of a personal remedy in every case.
It hardly follows, however, that the right-remedy principle is an empty
“slogan,”320 “pious cant,”321 a “trite jingle,”322 or a “historical relic.”323 Though
a remedy is not guaranteed for every right, “[f]ew principles of the American
constitutional tradition resonate more strongly than [the right-remedy
principle].”324 In almost all the states, the aspiration to provide remedies for
rights is a fundamental precept of constitutional government. To be sure, merely
reciting the right-remedy principle does not answer the difficult questions of
which rules of primary conduct count as “rights,” when those rights
presumptively imply remedies, and when that presumption is overcome by
countervailing reasons to deny relief. At the same time, recognizing that state
laws uniformly recognize the right-remedy principle and task state courts of
general jurisdiction with developing law for the redress of wrongs has important
implications for how we think about limits on remedies under state law. Every
state has concluded that providing remedies for legal wrongs is an important
state interest, and many have said so in their constitutional laws. And every state
has a body of law—the law of torts—designed specifically to implement the
fundamental aspiration to redress wrongs.325 If “what is needed to ground
governmental power is a legitimate government interest,”326 then state authority
to provide law for the redress of wrongs is a firmly grounded “democratic
norm[].”327
Our aim in this Part has been to show that states have a constitutionally
recognized interest in providing remedies for international human rights. Our
argument shifts the ground of debate; what presumptively seemed a “foreign
relations” matter for the federal government alone now appears a remedial
matter presumptively for state courts and state law to decide. If we are correct,

320

Paul Caritj, Note, Tortious Interference with the Expectancy of Entitlement Benefits, 45
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 455, 467 (2012).
321 Charles L. B. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L.
REV. 361, 364 (1932).
322 Id.
323 William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical
Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV.
333, 341 (1997).
324 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 37, at 1778.
325 As our colleague Professor Ken Simons has put it, tort law can be “understood as a
mode of private redress for wrongs.” Kenneth W. Simons, Victim Fault and Victim Strict
Responsibility in Anglo-American Tort Law, 8 J. TORT L. 29, 31 (2015).
326 Weinberg, supra note 38, at 1514.
327 Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 168, 170 (2011).
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then courts and legislatures working through the doctrinal limits on state
remedies for human rights must give due weight to the state’s interest in
providing remedies.328
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN
STATE COURTS AND UNDER STATE LAW
So far, we have argued that states have a significant role to play in promoting
human rights, including by making their courts available for human rights claims
and providing law for adjudicating those claims. This role is especially important
given the limits of the international framework for human rights protection and,
in the post-Kiobel era, the curtailed accessibility of federal courts for human
rights claims. We have also argued that states have the authority to remedy
human rights violations and a valid interest in doing so that draws its normative
force from the right-remedy principle, which is founded on state law, federal
law, international law, and political theory. We have demonstrated that this
interest may extend to human rights cases involving foreign parties and
violations occurring outside U.S. territory.
But the right to a remedy has never been absolute. As we discussed at the
outset, there are countervailing considerations. Critics argue that human rights
litigation in state courts or under state law may adversely affect the interests of

328

The right-remedy principle is related, both conceptually and doctrinally, to the principle
that the courts should be open. The open-courts principle under state constitutional law refers
to a constellation of ideas—“open access, independent judges authorized to sit in judgment of
the state and to assess the fairness of their own as well as other decision-making procedures,
[and] equal and dignified treatment of all participants”—about the role of courts and the
citizenry’s positive entitlement to them. Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in
Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 917, 938 (2012); cf. Whytock, supra note 3, at 2048 (“According to the right to court
access, a person generally is entitled to access to a fair hearing by an independent and
impartial court for the determination of a legal claim.”). The right-remedy principle is
different and more focused: It recognizes a right to law for the redress of wrongs and confirms
that states have a substantial interest in providing that law. There is, of course, some overlap;
state constitutional provisions that guarantee open courts may also recognize the right to a
remedy. International law keeps the two concepts distinct, while arguably treating the right to
court access as implicit in the right to a remedy. See, e.g., DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 16 (3d ed. 2015) (“The word ‘remedies’ contains two
separate concepts, the first being procedural and the second substantive. In the first sense,
remedies are the processes by which arguable claims of human rights violations are heard and
decided, whether by courts, administrative agencies, or other competent bodies. The second
notion of remedies refers to the outcome of the proceedings, the relief afforded to the
successful claimant.”). Though nothing about our argument necessarily turns on the label, the
right-remedy principle captures the nature of the state’s interest in providing remedies for
human rights violations, while the open-courts principle, with its emphasis on a fair hearing
and public access to judicial proceedings, does not.
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multinational corporations, offend foreign nations, or interfere with U.S. foreign
relations.329
The problem is that courts and commentators tend to take a categorical
approach that emphasizes the supposed costs of human rights litigation in state
courts or under state law without taking into account remedial concerns. More
importantly, when deciding whether to allow access to U.S. courts or the
application of U.S. law in human rights cases, judges often bar human rights
claimants from seeking a remedy based on assertions about the purported costs
but without considering the importance of state remedies for human rights and
the state interest in providing them. This occurs, for example, when U.S. courts
deny access to state courts by allowing removal of tort claims to federal court
on shaky grounds such as the federal common law of foreign relations, even
when the plaintiff’s claim is not based on that law.330
In this Part, we illustrate these tendencies by focusing on four court access
doctrines—the removal, political question, personal jurisdiction, and forum non
conveniens doctrines—and two sets of principles that may limit the application
of state law to provide remedies for human rights—federal preemption
principles and choice-of-law principles.331 We show that when applying them,
courts tend to ignore or downplay the state interest in remedying human rights
violations. We argue that proper application of these doctrines requires courts to
do two things. First, they must explicitly consider both a state’s interest in
providing remedies and the importance of remedies for individuals who have
been wronged, including in human rights cases. Second, if they determine that
other considerations outweigh these remedial considerations, they must give
explicit reasons showing why remedial considerations are outweighed.
To be clear, we do not suggest that these limiting doctrines will never bar
human rights claims. Rather, we argue that the right-remedy principle can and
should influence courts’ decisions under these doctrines. The result will be a
more balanced approach that takes seriously the contributions of states to human
rights.

329

See discussion supra Section II.A.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.1.
331
We acknowledge that other doctrines may potentially limit state remedies for human
rights violations. These doctrines may, for example, include foreign sovereign immunity and
foreign official immunity. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Immunities of Foreign Officials from
Civil Jurisdiction, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF IMMUNITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Tom Ruys, Nicolas Angelet & Luca Ferro eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 11, 14, 1719), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3098924 [https://perma.cc/4L32-N65G] (discussing foreign
official immunity); Whytock, supra note 3, at 2038-46 (discussing foreign sovereign
immunity). Space does not allow a thorough discussion of all such doctrines. As a normative
matter, however, we argue that the state interest in redressing wrongs should be explicitly
considered by courts whenever they apply these doctrines in human rights cases.
330

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

454
A.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:397

State Interests and Court Access Doctrines
1.

Foreign Relations Removal

Defendants in human rights lawsuits may invoke the doctrine of removal in
an attempt to avoid having claims against them adjudicated by state courts.
Under § 1441 of the U.S. Judiciary Code, a defendant may in some
circumstances remove a state court action to federal court, but only if the federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction.332 Depending on the citizenship of the
parties, there may be diversity jurisdiction, which would allow removal if the
defendant is not a citizen of the forum state.333 In addition, if the plaintiff’s claim
“aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,”334
removal may be allowed based on federal question jurisdiction.
The well-pleaded complaint rule “severely limits” removal,335 however,
including removal of state court human rights claims based on state law or
foreign law rather than federal law. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “a
right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must
be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action.”336 Human
rights claims based on state law or foreign law are not based on the federal law
of foreign relations and therefore should not be removable in the normal course.
Even when a plaintiff’s state court human rights claim is based solely on state
law or foreign law, a defendant may seek to remove the case to federal court
based on the argument that the case “implicates the ‘uniquely federal’ interest in
foreign relations, and so must be heard in a federal forum.”337 While some
circuits have made that leap and allowed so-called “foreign affairs removal,”338
332 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.”).
333 See id. § 1441(b)(2) (“A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought.”).
334 Id. § 1331.
335 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9
(1983).
336 Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
337 Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2001). A defendant may
undertake removal in an effort to secure pleading rules that are stricter in federal court than
in state court, as well as other procedural rules that may be more pro-defendant than in state
court.
338 See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding
federal question jurisdiction existed because “complaint raises substantial questions of federal
common law by implicating important foreign policy concerns”).
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the Ninth Circuit has not been so willing, holding instead that removal is not
appropriate “simply because a foreign government has expressed a special
interest in [a case’s] outcome.”339
Normatively, the right-remedy principle justifies the state interest in
redressing wrongs, including wrongs that violate human rights. Because one
purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule is to resolve conflicts between state
and federal jurisdiction,340 this interest militates against judicial dilution of the
well-pleaded complaint rule or expansion of the theory of foreign relations
removal. In light of a state’s legitimate interest in providing remedies for
wrongs, federal courts are right to be “reluctant” to find that a private state law
or foreign law action is removable simply because it arises from tortious human
rights violations abroad.341
The correct view is that human rights claims based on state law or foreign law
are not removable to federal court in the absence of jurisdictionally sufficient
diversity of citizenship. As Part III argued, the provision of remedies for wrongs
does not constitute “foreign relations” simply because those wrongs happen to
violate human rights. Thus, even without the well-pleaded complaint rule, these
suits ordinarily would not substantially implicate a federal interest in exclusive
control of foreign relations.

339

Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803. Scholars have strongly criticized foreign relations
removal. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2
CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 471 n.51 (2001) (“The basis for removal [in Torres] to federal court—
that the case arose under the ‘federal common law of foreign relations’—is questionable.”);
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
1697-98 (1997) (criticizing Torres decision, arguing that “federal common law rule
announced in Torres is inconsistent with scores of very similar cases in which federal
jurisdiction was denied” and that case “illustrate[s] the difficulties that inhere in a federal
common law of foreign relations”); Ernest A. Young, Federal Suits and General Laws: A
Comment on Judge Fletcher’s Reading of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 93 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
33, 37-38 (2007) (“Foreign affairs removal—under which some lower courts have allowed
removal from state court on the ground that a suit implicates federal foreign affairs interests,
even though there is no federal law element in the case—is an . . . unsanctioned and uncabined
judicial creation.”).
340 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9-10 (“[T]he ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule . . . as a
practical matter severely limits the number of cases in which state law ‘creates the cause of
action’ that may be initiated in or removed to federal district court, thereby avoiding moreor-less automatically a number of potentially serious federal-state conflicts.”).
341 Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e are
reluctant to find that the plaintiffs’ private cause of action sounding in Georgia tort law
implicates important foreign policy on the face of the plaintiffs’ pleadings.”). Ultimately, a
state court may dismiss a human rights case under state law, but federal courts should leave
that weighing of interests to the states in the first instance. Cf. AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549
S.E.2d 373, 378 (Ga. 2001) (holding that Georgia courts have discretion to dismiss human
rights action filed by non-resident non-citizens on forum non conveniens grounds).
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Even if the state court claim is based on CIL or on a state- or foreign-law
created cause of action to redress a violation of CIL, the claim is not necessarily
removable to federal court. First, whether a claim based on CIL arises under
federal law for purposes of establishing federal question jurisdiction is
uncertain—partly because it is unsettled whether CIL is part of federal law or
not.342 Second, such claims, as we have argued, do not necessarily implicate
foreign relations. The human rights claim of an individual or group against a
defendant—even a foreign sovereign defendant—is aimed at obtaining a remedy
for a right, whether declaratory, compensatory, or symbolic. The relationship at
issue is between an alleged victim of human rights violations and an alleged
perpetrator of the violation, not between a foreign nation and the United States.
For a court—especially a state court—in a discrete lawsuit to provide a remedy
for a particular human rights violation is not equivalent to the United States
taking a general policy position regarding a foreign country involved in the
alleged violation. Foreign countries are aware that the United States is a federal
system, with courts at the state and federal levels that are independent from the
other branches of government. Therefore, even when the claim is based on CIL,
there is a strong argument that foreign relations removal is not appropriate in the
absence of an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, in cases that are removed because of their foreign relations
implications, federal courts must still apply state substantive law (or, according
to state choice-of-law rules, foreign substantive law)343 and take seriously the
state’s remedial interest when assessing any foreign relations concerns under
other doctrinal headings.

342

See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 n.19 (2004) (“[The ATS] was
enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by
entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of nations; and we know of no
reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject to any comparable
congressional assumption.”). For an overview of the issue, see generally Gwynne Skinner,
When Customary International Law Violations Arise Under the Laws of the United States, 36
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 205 (2010) (examining whether non-statutory, common law claims for
violations of CIL “arise under the ‘laws of the United States’ for purposes of federal question
jurisdiction and Article III of the Constitution”). The literature is voluminous, but for an
argument that CIL is not federal law, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 815, 817 (1997) (arguing that CIL should not have status of federal law, because it is
founded on “questionable assumptions” and is “in tension with fundamental constitutional
principles”), and for a defense of the status of CIL as federal law, see Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1827 (1998) (arguing against
Bradley and Goldsmith’s position).
343 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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Political Question Doctrine

If a defendant does successfully remove a human rights claim to federal court,
it might, as a subsequent procedural move, file a motion to dismiss the claim
based on the political question doctrine. We argue, however, that a court’s
decision to provide law for the redress of human rights violations will rarely
raise a nonjusticiable political question.
As an initial matter, the political question doctrine is unlikely to be a barrier
as a matter of state law.344 Generally speaking, “state common law courts do
tend to hear an array of questions that would be nonjusticiable under federal
law,” including ones that would be political questions under federal doctrine.345
There are good reasons to think the political question doctrine should play an
even smaller role in state constitutional law than it does in federal constitutional
law.346 And, as we shall argue, the political question doctrine should not
preclude most human rights litigation in state courts or in federal courts under
state law.
Our argument is not that questions which are political when filed in federal
court become judicial simply upon being filed in state court. To the contrary, our
argument is that the political question doctrine under federal law should rarely
bar human rights claims, whether filed in federal court or in state court.
According to the federal political question doctrine, certain political questions
may be nonjusticiable. In Baker v. Carr,347 the Supreme Court enumerated six
criteria for identifying a political question, which include a “textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department,” a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it,” “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” and “the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.”348
The Supreme Court has stated that the political question doctrine is a doctrine
“of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’”349 It has been adamant in

344

The political question doctrine is most likely to be raised in state law human rights
claims brought in (or removed to) federal courts, but could also be raised in state courts. See,
e.g., Freeman v. Am. K-9 Detection Servs., L.L.C., 494 S.W.3d 393, 403 (Tex. App. 2015)
(denying motion to dismiss on political question grounds, among others).
345 Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1863 (2001).
346 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Political Question Doctrine in State Constitutional Law,
43 RUTGERS L.J. 573, 586-87, 590 (2013) (“[The] role for the political question doctrine in
state constitutional adjudication is a small one.”).
347 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
348 Id. at 217.
349 Id. (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”).
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maintaining that questions touching on foreign relations are not necessarily
nonjusticiable political questions.350 Thus, the Court has insisted that political
question doctrine analysis focus narrowly on the specific issues that a claimant
is asking to be decided, not on the indirect political implications of a claim. For
example, Zivotofsky v. Clinton351 involved a federal statute permitting U.S.
citizens born in Jerusalem to elect to have “Israel” indicated in their passports as
their place of birth.352 The petitioner, a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem, made
such an election. However, the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual
required passport officials to enter “Jerusalem” rather than “Israel” for persons
born in Jerusalem, based on the Department’s policy of not taking a position
regarding the political status of Jerusalem. The Department, therefore, refused
to honor the petitioner’s election.353 The district court dismissed the case based
on the political question doctrine, reasoning that deciding the petitioner’s claim
would require it to determine the political status of Jerusalem, and the court of
appeals affirmed, reasoning that deciding the claim would require courts to
intrude on the Executive’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns.354
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the lower courts mischaracterized the
question presented and concluding that the question presented required the
courts to adjudicate “a specific statutory right,” not to “supplant a foreign policy
decision of the political branches.”355 The enforcement of a specific right, the
Court concluded, “is a familiar judicial exercise.”356
Human rights cases in state courts or under state law should rarely be subject
to dismissal under Zivotofsky’s refined political question doctrine. As our
discussion of the right-remedy principle shows, human rights claims directly
raise only two questions: whether the claimant’s rights have been violated and,
if so, what the appropriate remedy is. Even if a human rights claim has foreign
relations implications, this is not by itself enough to require dismissal based on
the political question doctrine. To the contrary, the application of legal rules to

350 Id.; see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986)
(rejecting petitioners’ argument based on political question doctrine that respondents’ claims
were “unsuitable for judicial review because they involve foreign relations” and emphasizing
that “not every matter touching on politics is a political question . . . and more specifically,
that it is ‘error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance’” (citations omitted)).
351 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
352 Id. at 191.
353 Id. at 192.
354 Id. at 193-95.
355 Id. at 196.
356 Id.
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determine whether a remedy is available for the violation of a right is “a familiar
judicial exercise.”357
In fact, the executive branch has taken this position in litigation. In its amicus
brief in Filártiga, the United States argued against dismissal on political
question grounds. It argued that “[t]he courts are properly confined to
determining whether an individual has suffered a denial of rights guaranteed him
as an individual by customary international law.”358 Although the brief
acknowledged that human rights cases can implicate foreign relations, it
concluded that “the protection of fundamental human rights is not committed
exclusively to the political branches of the government.”359
Our argument shows why that would be the case not only for federal courts,
but also for state courts. The provision of remedies for rights—including human
rights—is not committed to the political branches. To the contrary, as we have
argued, this is a traditional function of courts (including state courts). When
human rights claims are based on state tort law, there will be no lack of
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”360 State remedies for rights

357

Moreover, some have read Zivotofsky as refining the political question so as to turn
only on the first two Baker factors—“‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department’ and ‘a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it.’” Id. at 202 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)). As Professor Harlan Cohen explains:
Notably, in discussing application of the political question doctrine, Chief Justice
Roberts mentioned only the first two Baker factors—“a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department” and “a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” The other four—
the avoidance of judicial policymaking, the need to avoid embarrassment, the need for
finality, or concerns about maintaining “one voice” in foreign affairs—are notably
omitted. The implication that those four factors were no longer valid was not lost on
Justice Sotomayor, who wrote a concurrence with the main purpose of resuscitating
them.
Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1,
20 (2017). If this reading is correct, then it would be even less likely that a human rights claim
under state law would be dismissed on political question grounds. After all, providing
remedies for human rights is not textually committed to the political branches. To the
contrary, as we have argued, providing remedies for rights violations is a fundamental
function of states. And, because courts are capable of determining and applying state law,
foreign law, and international law, and routinely do so, there is no lack of manageable
standards.
358 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
359 Id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 430 n.34 (1964)).
360 Cf. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an
Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 380 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(noting that under existing doctrine “[c]ommon-law tort claims are rarely thought to present
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under CIL will be no less judicially manageable in most cases.361 Deciding
whether rights have been violated requires the application of law to facts, and
does not require any “initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.”362
Nor should federal courts intervene to preclude state remedies for human
rights under the political question doctrine. Congress or the executive branch
could conceivably make an affirmative decision to prohibit states from
providing remedies for violations of human rights, but then the analysis would
turn on preemption doctrine, not on political question principles. And perhaps
in some cases, Congress or the executive branch may make a pronouncement
regarding a particular country’s human rights performance, but it is unlikely that
either would do so on the “one question” before a court in a human rights case:
whether to provide a remedy for a right.363

nonjusticiable political questions” and arguing that they should never be dismissed on
political question grounds).
361 It is possible, however, that when claims are based on highly uncertain areas of CIL,
such standards may be lacking—but where there is such a high degree of uncertainty it is
unlikely that a court would find that a rule of CIL exists in the first place. See JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-25 (8th ed. 2012)
(noting that CIL is by definition general practice of states accepted as law, and there must be
high degree of uniformity and consistency of practice). Where there is little or no reason to
think that CIL establishes a right, there is correspondingly less reason to think that providing
remedies is within a state’s traditional competence. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified
Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 700 (1990) (arguing that “terminology of
the political question doctrine . . . should be replaced by” focusing on question “of what” rules
of primary conduct “should be judicially unenforceable”).
362 Ewing & Kysar, supra note 360, at 380. This, however, may not always be the case.
See, e.g., Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 977-84 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of
dismissal on political question grounds in suit against provider of equipment to Israeli Defense
Force to destroy homes in Palestinian Territories, in which plaintiffs argued that Israel’s
policy violated international law).
363 To be clear, our argument is not that a human rights case will never involve a political
question. Professor Tara Leigh Grove has recently shown that the traditional political question
doctrine—the one existing prior to Baker v. Carr—treated some factual questions as
“political” ones, which triggered federal and state judicial deference to the political branches’
factual determinations. Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1915-16 (2015). Among these factual, political questions
was the question of whether the United States was still a party to a treaty. Id. at 1917
(including questions such as “the date on which a war began or ended” and “whether a certain
group of Native Americans constituted a ‘tribe’”). We can imagine this kind of factual,
political question arising in a human rights case and think it may well be appropriate for a
state or federal court to defer to the political branches’ answer to it.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

2018]
3.

STATE REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

461

Personal Jurisdiction

Whether a remedy for a human rights violation is sought in state court or
federal court, a defendant may, of course, file a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Two otherwise similar claims should not be treated
differently under personal jurisdiction doctrine merely because one of them is
based on conduct that would be a human rights violation. That is, personal
jurisdiction is not more of a barrier to plaintiffs seeking remedies for human
rights than for plaintiffs seeking remedies for other wrongs. Nevertheless, we
devote some attention here to personal jurisdiction because it may indeed be a
growing barrier for human rights claims against non-U.S. defendants, just as it
is for claims against foreign defendants in general. Doctrinally, we show how
the state interest in providing remedies for human rights is relevant to personal
jurisdiction analysis and, in some cases, may influence outcomes in favor of a
finding of jurisdiction. Normatively, the validity of the state interest in
redressing human rights violations serves as the basis for criticizing the direction
in which the law of personal jurisdiction is evolving in transnational litigation.
As the Supreme Court recently reiterated:
The canonical opinion in this area remains International Shoe [Co. v.
Washington], . . . in which we held that a State may authorize its courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the
defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”364
This standard evolved into two categories of personal jurisdiction. Under the
doctrine of specific jurisdiction, a court in a particular state may assert
jurisdiction over a defendant even if the defendant has engaged only in “single
or occasional acts” in the forum state, provided that the plaintiff’s claim “aris[es]
out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”365 Under the
doctrine of general jurisdiction, a court in a particular state may assert
jurisdiction over a defendant even if the plaintiff’s claim is unrelated to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state, if those contacts “are so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”366
“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction
is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in
which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home,” such as its place of
incorporation or principal place of business367—but these are not the only places

364
365
366
367

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (citations omitted).
Id. at 754 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
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where a corporation may be at home for general jurisdiction purposes.368 In
addition, a court may assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is
personally served in the forum state, even in suits unrelated to the defendant’s
in-state activities.369 Thus, the requirements for personal jurisdiction can be met
if a human rights claim arises out of the defendant’s activity in the forum state;
if the defendant is a corporation incorporated in the forum state or with its
principal place of business there, or an individual domiciled there; or if the
defendant is an individual personally served in the forum state.
On the other hand, personal jurisdiction will bar human rights suits—as well
as any other type of suits—in states with which the defendant has no contacts
that are related to the plaintiff’s claim and in which the defendant neither has
contacts sufficient to render it at home nor is an individual personally served
there.
But this does not mean that the state’s interest in providing for redress of
wrongs has no role to play in personal jurisdiction analysis. To the contrary, the
plaintiff’s interest in a forum in which to pursue a remedy, and the forum state’s
interest in providing a remedy, are among the factors that courts must consider
when evaluating the reasonableness of an assertion of personal jurisdiction.370
As the Supreme Court has pointed out, “[t]hese considerations sometimes serve
to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum
contacts than would otherwise be required.”371 The right-remedy principle
reinforces the importance of weighing the state’s interest in providing remedies
for human rights violations in this analysis. More generally, the right-remedy
principle should be among the considerations in close cases—for example, when
it would be equally plausible to conclude that the extent of contacts or degree of
relatedness is or is not sufficient for specific jurisdiction, or when it appears that
a corporate defendant may be “at home” for general jurisdiction purposes in a
state other than its state of incorporation or principal place of business.372

368

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (acknowledging that corporations may still be subject to
general jurisdiction in forums where they are neither incorporated nor have their principal
place of business).
369 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 627 (1990).
370 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (“[T]he
determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend
on an evaluation of several factors. A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the
interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh
in its determination ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.’” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980))).
371 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
372 See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19 (“We do not foreclose the possibility that in an
exceptional case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of
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Some commentators suggest that the Court’s personal jurisdiction holding in
Daimler AG v. Bauman makes personal jurisdiction an even more imposing
barrier to human rights claims in U.S. courts.373 Filed in federal court in
California, Bauman was a “foreign cubed” case that “concern[ed] the authority
of a court in the United States to entertain a claim brought by foreign plaintiffs
against a foreign defendant based on events occurring entirely outside the United
States.”374 The plaintiffs, who were Argentine citizens, sued a German company,
alleging that the defendant’s Argentine subsidiary collaborated with Argentine
security forces to kidnap, detain, and kill Argentine workers during Argentina’s
“Dirty War.”375 Because none of the defendant’s activity giving rise to the claim
occurred in California, the only potential basis for personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was general jurisdiction. Due to the paucity of California contacts on
the part of the defendant and its Argentine subsidiary, the plaintiffs attempted to
base jurisdiction on the California contacts of a separate subsidiary of the
defendant that was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of
business in New Jersey.376 The Supreme Court, assuming for the purposes of the
decision that the Delaware subsidiary’s California contacts would be sufficient
for Daimler to be subject to general jurisdiction in a California court, held that
the defendant lacked sufficient contacts to be subject to general jurisdiction in
California, even if the subsidiary’s California contacts could be imputed to the
parent.377
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bauman is best understood as a specific
application of the rule pronounced in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown,378 that general jurisdiction requires that the defendant’s “affiliations
with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at
home in the forum State.”379 Under these facts, the defendant’s contacts with
California were simply not enough. It is possible, but incorrect, to read Bauman
more broadly to suggest that states do not have an interest in asserting
jurisdiction to provide remedies for human rights violations. The Bauman Court

incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to
render the corporation at home in that State.”).
373 See Corbett, supra note 257, at 51; Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing
Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by
Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158,
163 (2014) (arguing that even if plaintiffs can successfully rebut presumption of
extraterritoriality, “Bauman may still present a significant barrier”).
374 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 750.
375 Id. at 750-51.
376 Id. at 751.
377 Id. at 749 (explaining that relying on plaintiff’s reasoning would result in general
jurisdiction in too many cases).
378 564 U.S. 915 (2011)
379 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
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noted that the Ninth Circuit had supported its finding of jurisdiction based in
part on plaintiffs’ assertion of human rights claims under the ATS, and it quoted
language from the lower court’s opinion stating that “American federal courts,
be they in California or any other state, have a strong interest in adjudicating and
redressing international human rights abuses.”380 The Supreme Court’s opinion
then noted, however, that after the Kiobel decision, plaintiffs’ ATS claims were
“infirm.”381 By doing so, the Bauman court was simply describing the impact of
its earlier Kiobel decision on human rights claims in federal courts based on the
ATS. This dictum does not contradict the Ninth Circuit’s statement that federal
courts have a strong interest in providing remedies for human rights violations,
and it does not refer to state courts at all. It merely says that as a matter of federal
law, plaintiffs’ ATS claims could not survive in federal court. It does not address
whether states can provide remedies, which is a matter—as we have argued—of
state authority and state interests. We have argued that a state’s constitutionally
recognized interest in remedying wrongs justifies state remedies for human
rights in many cases. Given this constitutionally recognized interest, we think it
would be reading Bauman for more than it is worth to conclude that states have
no interest in redressing human rights violations.
In any event, there remain other avenues to personal jurisdiction in human
rights cases, including, most importantly, “foreign-squared” cases.382 Bauman
did not hold for purposes of personal jurisdiction analysis that states lack a
significant interest in providing remedies in human rights cases. Moreover,
Bauman leaves some routes open to general jurisdiction over non-U.S.
corporations, even on the facts of Bauman itself.383 As courts work through these
doctrinal problems, a state’s interest in providing remedies should be a
significant factor.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court384 might be read as imposing new limits that might make human rights
suits in U.S. courts more difficult. In that case, a group of plaintiffs—some of
whom were California residents and some of whom were not—filed product

380

Id. at 762.
Id. at 763.
382 It is a mistake to assume that most human rights litigation involves “foreign-cubed”
cases like Bauman without links to the United States.
383 In Bauman, the plaintiffs premised personal jurisdiction over Daimler (a non-U.S.
corporation) based upon the contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA (a U.S. corporation and Daimler
subsidiary) with California. The Court held that even if Mercedes-Benz USA was “at home
in California” and its “contacts are imputable to Daimler,” there would still be no general
jurisdiction over Daimler. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760. As Childress asks, “would Daimler be
subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware or New Jersey, where MBUSA would be subject
to general jurisdiction [under Bauman]?” Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction
After Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 197, 207-08 (2014).
384 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
381
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liability claims against Bristol-Myers Squibb in a California Superior Court.385
The California Supreme Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal’s
holding that there was specific jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb.386 The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court as to the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims, criticizing it for its “sliding scale approach” whereby
“the strength of the requisite connection between the forum and the specific
claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive forum contacts that are
unrelated to those claims.”387 The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that “[i]n
order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must ‘aris[e] out
of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”388 Finding that “[t]he
relevant plaintiffs are not California residents and do not claim to have suffered
harm in that State” and that “all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’
claims occurred elsewhere,” the Court held that California lacked jurisdiction.389
However, it is far from clear that Bristol-Myers Squibb would make personal
jurisdiction significantly more difficult to obtain in most human rights cases.
First, the Court decided the case was based on a “straightforward application . . .
of settled principles of personal jurisdiction.”390 It is best read as insisting on a
strict application of the relatedness requirement for specific jurisdiction. In
addition to rejecting California’s sliding scale approach to relatedness, the Court
confirmed that forum contacts of the defendant related to the resident plaintiffs’
claims cannot be used to satisfy the relatedness requirement for the non-resident
plaintiffs’ claims.391 Rather, “[w]hat is needed—and what is missing [in the
California Supreme Court’s reasoning]—is a connection between the forum and
the specific claims at issue”—namely, the non-resident plaintiffs’ claims.392 By
noting the key facts that the non-California plaintiffs were not injured in
California and none of the defendant’s conduct giving rise to the plaintiffs’
claims was inside California, the Court implied that the presence of injury or
conduct in the forum state are the types of connections that could count toward
satisfying the relatedness requirement—and for many human rights claims, this
will be the case.393

385

Id. at 1777.
Id.
387
Id. at 1776.
388 Id. at 1780 (quoting Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754).
389 Id. at 1782.
390 Id. at 1783.
391 See id. at 1781 (“The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and
ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’
claims.”).
392 Id.
393 See id. at 1782-83.
386
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Second, the Court emphasized what is already part of the required
reasonableness analysis: “In determining whether personal jurisdiction is
present, a court must consider a variety of interests” including “the interests of
the forum State.”394 The Court thus preserved the doctrinal link between
personal jurisdiction and the state interest in providing remedies for human
rights that may, in close cases at least, tip the balance in favor of a finding of
personal jurisdiction.
Finally, there is a strong doctrinal and normative case to be made for a
national-contacts approach to specific jurisdiction, whereby the relevant forum
for determining a non-U.S. defendant’s minimum contacts would be the United
States as a whole rather than the particular state in which the court sits.395 Other
things being equal, this approach may facilitate jurisdiction in human rights suits
against non-U.S. parties, even post-Bristol-Myers Squibb.
Even if neither Bauman nor Bristol-Myers Squibb significantly changed
personal jurisdiction doctrine, together they confirm that personal jurisdiction
will be difficult to obtain in most so-called “foreign-cubed” cases—that is, cases
with non-U.S. plaintiffs, non-U.S. defendants, and arising out of non-U.S.
activity. General jurisdiction will not be available because a defendant that is
neither incorporated in nor has its principal place of business in a U.S. state is
unlikely to be considered “at home” in any state.396 For specific jurisdiction, the
plaintiff will have to establish that the defendant had minimum contacts with the
forum state related to the plaintiff’s claim, which obviously will not be possible
if defendant has no related contacts with the forum state.
4.

Forum Non Conveniens

Even if a court has personal jurisdiction, a defendant in a human rights lawsuit
may file a motion to dismiss based on the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Properly taken into account, the right-remedy principle means that such
dismissals generally will not be appropriate.

394

Id. at 1780.
See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1, 6) (deriving support for jurisdiction from
fairness and interstate-federalism components of personal jurisdiction); see also Patrick J.
Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to (Partially) Clean up
the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413 (2017) (proposing to extend Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)—which in its current form allows for nationwide personal
jurisdiction in federal question cases in which plaintiff would not have another U.S. forum—
to include diversity and alienage cases).
396 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014). However, the Bauman Court left
open the possibility of finding a corporate defendant “at home” in other circumstances. See
id. at 760 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction
only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed
those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”).
395

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

2018]

STATE REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

467

Under the forum non conveniens doctrine, a “court may dismiss an action on
the ground that a court abroad is the more appropriate and convenient forum for
adjudicating the controversy.”397 We focus here on the federal forum non
conveniens doctrine. There are also state forum non conveniens doctrines
applied by state courts, for which space does not allow a detailed discussion. It
should be noted, however, that state forum non conveniens doctrines generally
follow the federal approach.398 Some state doctrines differ from the federal
doctrine, however, with some imposing more and some imposing less stringent
requirements for dismissal.399
The federal forum non conveniens doctrine has three main elements. The first
element requires a court to determine whether the defendant’s proposed foreign
court is an available and adequate alternative forum. Unless it is, a forum non
conveniens dismissal is not permitted.400 A foreign court is ordinarily deemed
available if the defendant is subject to its jurisdiction.401 A foreign court is
generally deemed adequate for forum non conveniens purposes unless the
potential remedy it offers “is so clearly inadequate . . . that it is no remedy at
all,”402 such as “where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the
subject matter of the dispute,”403 although some scholars have argued for, and
some courts have applied, a more rigorous foreign judicial adequacy standard.404

397

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
See Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77
TUL. L. REV. 309, 315 (2002) (“Thirty states, the District of Columbia, and all U.S. territories
engage in an analysis effectively identical to that undertaken in federal courts, and thirteen
other states employ a factor-based analysis very similar to [the one] used [by the Supreme
Court].”).
399 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 304 reporters’ note 2
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016).
400 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); see also 14D WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 170, § 3828.3, at 629.
401 See Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22; Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th
Cir. 2011); 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 170, § 3828.3, at 639. Defendants often satisfy
this requirement by consenting to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum. See id. (noting that
dismissal is generally conditioned on defendant accepting personal jurisdiction in alternative
forum).
402 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254.
403 Id. at 254 & n.22. The Supreme Court noted the example of a “court refus[ing] to
dismiss, where alternative forum is Ecuador, it is unclear whether Ecuadorean tribunal will
hear the case, and there is no generally codified Ecuadorean legal remedy for the unjust
enrichment and tort claims asserted.” Id. at 254-55 & n.22 (citing Phx. Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 456 (D. Del. 1978)). A foreign court may be deemed adequate and
dismissal may be granted even if the law that the foreign court would apply is less favorable
to the plaintiff than the law that a U.S. court would apply. See id. at 250.
404 Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1456-60 (2011).
398
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The doctrine’s second element requires a court to analyze private and public
interest factors to determine whether they point toward dismissal in favor of the
defendant’s proposed foreign court.405 The Supreme Court has described the
private interest factors as follows:
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost
of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There
may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is
obtained.406
The Supreme Court has described the public interest factors as follows:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a
burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which
has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many
persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather
than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only.
There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.
There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather
than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of
laws, and in law foreign to itself.407
Third, in order to assess whether the private and public factors point strongly
enough toward the foreign court to justify dismissal, the court must determine
what degree of deference it owes to the plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. court. This
depends on whether the plaintiff is a U.S. or foreign citizen. According to the
Supreme Court, “there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the
plaintiff’s choice of forum, which may be overcome only when the private and
public interest factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative forum.”408
However, the Court also held this presumption applies with less force to foreign
plaintiffs.409
The right-remedy principle plays an important role in case-specific forum non
conveniens analysis. First, although the classic formulation of the federal forum
non conveniens doctrine refers to the “local interest” in “localized
controversies,” the right-remedy principle provides a basis for a strong interest
405

See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 170, § 3828.4, at 673.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508; see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U.S. 443, 448 (1994).
407 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09; see also Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 448-49.
408 Piper, 454 U.S. at 255; see also Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
409 Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56.
406
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of the forum state in providing access to a remedy for human rights violations.410
An underlying purpose of the doctrine is to preserve access to a court that can
provide a remedy.411 To apply the doctrine without properly weighing the state’s
interest in remedying human rights violations would defeat that purpose.
Second, the right-remedy principle compels a rigorous application of the
doctrine’s adequate alternative forum analysis, one that will ensure that the
alternative forum is one that can fairly and impartially—and independently of
political influence—determine whether the claimant’s rights were violated and,
if so, provide a meaningful remedy. For example, in Gutierrez v. Advanced
Medical Optics, Inc.,412 the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order
dismissing a suit on forum non conveniens grounds because the alternative
forum had declined to accept jurisdiction, rendering it unavailable.413 The court
of appeals noted that “[a]t its core, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
concerned with fairness to the parties” and emphasized the objective that “every
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress.”414 The court reasoned that “to simply affirm the district court without
acknowledging that Plaintiffs do not have a forum in which to bring their case
would, apparently, be to leave their . . . injuries wholly unredressed.”415
Third, the right-remedy principle underscores the importance of the
judgment-enforceability factor in forum non conveniens analysis. After all, if a
judgment by the defendant’s alternative forum would not be enforceable, the
dismissal would be tantamount to denying the plaintiff any opportunity to pursue
a remedy at all. The availability of an enforceable judgment from the alternative
forum will generally depend on whether the defendant has sufficient assets in
that forum so that the judgment can be enforced there, or on whether the
defendant has sufficient assets in another jurisdiction—such as the United
States—and whether that other jurisdiction’s rules governing the enforcement of
foreign country judgments there would give the plaintiff the right to enforce the
judgment against the defendant’s assets there. As this is not always the case, the
right-remedy principle requires careful analysis of these questions.416

410

Whytock & Robertson, supra note 404, at 1461.
Cf. id. at 1454.
412 640 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2011).
413 Id. at 1027.
414 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
415 Id.
416 See Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 376 P.3d 960, 984-85 (Or. 2016) (citing
Whytock & Robertson, supra note 404) (“If . . . the court determines that the judicial system
in the alternative forum fails to comport with minimum standards of due process, such that its
judgments would be unenforceable where the defendant’s assets are located, that forum is
inherently inadequate and the defendant’s motion will fail at this first step.”). For an
explanation of the importance of the judgment enforceability factor and a proposed
methodology for applying the factor, see generally Tarik R. Hansen & Christopher A.
411
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The Applicable Law

Human rights lawsuits may be based on state law, which could provide a
remedy through tort law or by recognizing a right of action to enforce CIL or
treaty law. Such suits may also, as a matter of state choice-of-law doctrine, be
based upon causes of action under foreign law. In this Section we consider the
implications of our normative arguments for questions of the applicable law,
focusing upon choice of law and preemption.
1.

Choice of Law

In some cases, choice of law is a potential barrier to state remedies for human
rights. Sometimes, of course, both forum and foreign tort law will provide a
basis for a plaintiff’s claim, making the choice-of-law issue less salient than in
cases where either forum or foreign law does not recognize the plaintiff’s alleged
wrong.417 In the latter cases, however, choice of law can determine whether a
plaintiff’s claim can proceed. If, according to the forum’s choice-of-law rules,
foreign law applies and provides a basis for the claim, then the suit might
proceed. But if, according to the forum’s choice-of-law rules, the applicable law
does not provide a basis for the claim, then the claim may not proceed.
It is difficult to generalize about choice of law, because different states have
different choice-of-law rules. As Professor Roger Alford has discussed, there
“are numerous approaches” in the various states’ choice of law rules, with
different approaches tending towards different outcomes in human rights
cases.418 Generally speaking, however, choice-of-law rules take into account
factors including the domicile or citizenship of the parties and the territorial
locus of the conduct and injury giving rise to the claim. For this reason, choiceof-law decisions will tend to be substantially influenced by these factors. At one
extreme, when plaintiff and defendant are both citizens of a foreign country and
all of the alleged conduct and injuries occurred in that foreign country, a court

Whytock, The Judgment Enforceability Factor in Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 101 IOWA
L. REV. 923 (2016).
417 In tort actions, foreign law will almost certainly recognize a right to a remedy for “harm
to life, liberty, dignity, physical and mental integrity and property,” human rights that
encompass most of the cases filed in domestic courts. See Alford, supra note 19, at 1763
(quoting 3 EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORP. COMPLICITY IN INT’L CRIMES, INT’L COMM’N OF
JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL REMEDIES 11 (2008),
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.3-Corporate-legal-accountability-them
atic-report-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECD3-7ZRD]). For an overview of choice-of-law
issues that arise in tort-based human rights suits, see Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws
Considerations in State Court Human Rights Actions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 45, 49-55 (2013).
418 See Alford, supra note 19, at 1749, 1762. See generally Alford, supra note 11. Professor
Symeon Symeonides has categorized seven methods for choice of law in torts cases. SYMEON
C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
64 tbl.4 (2006).
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is likely to apply the foreign country’s law; but when one or more parties are
citizens of the forum state, or when one or more instances of conduct or injury
occurred in the forum state, the likelihood may increase that the court will apply
forum law.419
However, a state’s constitutionally-recognized interest in providing redress
for legal wrongs has implications for a variety of choice-of-law methods that
incorporate other factors into the analysis. For example, the leading choice-oflaw method in the United States—the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws—includes among its choice-of-law factors “the relevant policies of the
forum”420 and “the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue.”421 When
applying the Second Restatement, courts should give due weight to the forum
state’s interest in redressing wrongs, including when such wrongs violate human
rights.422 The Second Restatement’s choice-of-law factors also include “the
needs of the interstate and international systems.”423 When applying this factor,
courts should give due weight to the needs of the international human rights
system, including its reliance on domestic courts to enforce human rights.424
Another factor is “the basic policies underlying the particular field of law.”425
The remedial policy of states is a fundamental policy underlying state tort law;
thus, it should also be considered in choice-of-law analysis.426
A state’s constitutionally recognized interest in providing remedies for rights
should also be weighed when applying choice-of-law methods based on interest
analysis. The father of interest analysis, Professor Brainerd Currie, argued that
a state generally has an interest in having its law apply only to protect its own
residents, not foreign residents.427 But, as John Hart Ely has demonstrated, “the
premise that states are ‘interested’ only in generating verdicts for their own
citizens . . . is out of accord with any sensible notion of what lawmakers either

419

See Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 777 (explaining that while not certain, these variables provide fairly
reliable rule to reduce uncertainty).
420 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
421 Id. § 6(2)(c).
422 See id. § 6(2) cmt. e.
423 Id. § 6(2)(a).
424 See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
425 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
426 See id. § 6(2) cmt. h.
427 See, e.g., BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 86 (1963);
see also KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 46 (2d ed. 2015) (noting that Currie “posits
a ‘selfish state,’ interested only in the welfare of its domiciliaries”); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES,
CHOICE OF LAW 99-100 (2016) (“Currie assumed that, in the vast majority of cases, a state has
an interest in applying its law only when it would benefit its own domiciliaries, but not when
it would benefit similarly situated non-domiciliaries . . . .”).
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are or should be doing.”428 The right-remedy principle reinforces this conclusion
by providing a basis for a more general state interest in applying its law to
provide remedies for wrongs, independent of the domicile of the person injured.
There are reasons to think that choice of law “should not be a mechanism for
corrective justice,” full stop.429 After all, “tort law involves a compromise
between plaintiff-protecting . . . and defendant-protecting interests.”430 But a
state’s potential interest in “provid[ing] full civil recourse to [the] victims” of a
tort is owed consideration in domestic litigation,431 and we see no grounds in
choice of law doctrine to think that this interest is no longer worth considering
whenever a case has human rights or foreign elements.432
In theory, states are not completely free to make choice-of-law decisions as
they see fit. In sister-state choice-of-law cases, the Supreme Court has held that
“for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair.”433 However, the applicability of this standard in
international cases is unclear, especially because one of the bases for the
standard is the U.S. Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, which does not

428

John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 173, 208 (1981); see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 427, at 100 (describing
criticism of Currie’s assumption that states only have interest in protecting their own
domiciliaries).
429 Scott Fruehwald, A Multilateralist Method of Choice of Law, 85 KY. L.J. 347, 368
(1996) (explaining that choice of law should be substantively neutral because it would be
improper for judge to decide which state’s law to apply based on his or her personal view of
which is more just); see also Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in the Conflict of
Laws: The Paradox of Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 947-48 (2004) (“Corrective
justice is more a value by which to judge competing outcomes in litigation than a methodology
or analytical technique for resolving cases.”).
430 Joseph William Singer, Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness in the
Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923, 1934 (arguing that it is “nonsense” to apply the
law of one state over another because it “better achieves tort law policy” without balancing
reasons behind such policies).
431 Id. at 1931.
432 Cf. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (invoking
public-policy exception on right-remedy grounds when applying lex loci delicti approach to
choice of law).
433 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (holding that Minnesota
Supreme Court did not violate Due Process Clause or Full Faith and Credit Clause of U.S.
Constitution by applying Minnesota law because aggregation of contacts in state established
state interest and thus warranted application of state law without being arbitrary or unfair).
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apply to foreign countries.434 In any event, it is generally understood that this
standard is lenient and easily satisfied.435 Nevertheless, even in international
cases, when a state simply has no connection to the parties or events giving rise
to the plaintiff’s claim, there will ordinarily be questions about the ability of that
state to apply its law. It is important to remember, however, that the nonapplication of forum state law is not necessarily fatal to a human rights claim.
As we have argued above, such claims might alternatively proceed on the basis
of foreign law or international law.436 The answer will depend on the content of
the applicable law, whether it is forum law, foreign law, or international law.
Aside from choice of law, some commentators have considered whether there
should be a presumption against the extraterritorial application of state law
similar to the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal
law.437 However, the federal presumption against extraterritoriality created by
the Supreme Court does not apply to state law—it refers solely to federal law.438
States may, and some states have, independently stated presumptions against
extraterritorial application of their own statutes—but this is not the case for
common law and, as Judge Jeffrey Meyer of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut has argued, for a variety of structural reasons a
presumption against extraterritorial application of common law would make
little sense.439 Moreover, one of the primary rationales for a presumption against
extraterritoriality, according to the Supreme Court, is that allowing U.S. statutes
to apply to conduct abroad “presents . . . danger of international friction.”440 But
the right-remedy principle shows why this rationale is suspect as a basis for a
presumption against extraterritoriality: when a state applies its law
434 The other basis is the Due Process Clause, which creates the possibility that Allstate
has implications for limits in international cases too. See id. at 320.
435 See SYMEONIDES, supra note 427, at 28 (referring to Supreme Court’s approach as
“laissez-faire”).
436 See discussion supra Section IV.B.
437 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (stating “canon
of statutory construction known as the presumption against extraterritoriality” is “[a]bsent
clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have
only domestic application” (citations omitted)). See generally Florey, supra note 280
(discussing possibility of presumption against extraterritorial application of state law).
438 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100 (referring exclusively to federal laws—that federal
laws will be construed to have only domestic application absent clearly contrary intent from
Congress); Meyer, supra note 266, at 331-34 (arguing that under Erie doctrine, states, not
federal courts, have authority to decide reach of state law).
439 Meyer, supra note 266, at 301, 330 (“[J]urisprudential differences between the common
law and statutes explain why the common law—perhaps counterintuitively—should not be
subject to a presumption against extraterritoriality.”).
440 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107 (2016). But see id. at 2116 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment) (refusing to accept “international
strife” argument under facts of case).
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extraterritorially, it is acting upon the well-established interest to provide
remedies for rights. Even if doing so in human rights cases would have some
plausible effect on foreign relations—something which in many if not most
cases will be doubtful441—there is no reason why such an effect should
categorically trump the right-remedy principle whether in the form of a
presumption against extraterritoriality or otherwise. In any event, when claims
are based on foreign or international law, there will be no issue about the
extraterritorial application of state law.
2.

Preemption

Choice-of-law rules may point to remedies under foreign law or under state
law. Where state law provides a right to a remedy, defendants may argue that
federal law preempts it.442 The strength of such preemption arguments depends
in part on whether the plaintiff claims relief under state tort law or based on a
state-created right of action under CIL or treaty law.
a.

State Tort Law

Federal law may preempt state law when federal law expressly preempts state
law (express preemption), when Congress intends federal law to “occupy the
field” of an area of regulation (field preemption), or when there is a conflict
between state law and federal law (conflict preemption).443 The doctrines of field
preemption and conflict preemption are sometimes used to preempt state laws
that are said to involve foreign relations. In American Insurance Ass’n v.
Garamendi,444 the Supreme Court stated:
There is . . . no question that at some point an exercise of state power that
touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s
policy, given the ‘concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with
foreign nations’ that animated the Constitution’s allocation of the foreign
relations power to the National Government in the first place.445
441 See, e.g., id. at 2116 (“Unlike the Court, I cannot accept as controlling the
Government’s argument as amicus curiae that ‘[a]llowing recovery for foreign injuries in a
civil RICO action . . . presents the . . . danger of international friction.’” (quoting majority
opinion)).
442 In theory, there might be a preemption concern with the choice of foreign law. But, as
Alford has argued, “[f]oreign affairs preemption does not preempt a state court’s exercise of
its choice-of-law rules to apply foreign tort laws.” Alford, supra note 11, at 1160.
443 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
444 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
445 Id. at 413 (citations omitted); see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968)
(“[State] regulations must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s
foreign policy.”). In Garamendi, the Court declined to state whether, in foreign relations
cases, it was necessary to make a “categorical choice” between the theories of field and
conflict preemption, instead calling them “complementary.” Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 &
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One might argue that foreign relations preemption should preclude state or
federal courts from applying state law—including state tort law—to provide
remedies for wrongs that are violations of human rights.
In some cases, preemption may be appropriate. There are important reasons
for the foreign relations preemption doctrine. When properly applied, it can help
prevent states from implementing policies that undermine the foreign relations
functions that the Constitution vests in the federal government, and it can
promote the value of having the United States speak with “one voice” in its
official relations with foreign countries.446 For two reasons, however,
preemption doctrine should not presumptively bar human rights claims based on
state law, including state tort law.447
i.

The Remedial Function of State Law

First, the application of state law to provide redress for wrongs is a remedial
function of domestic law. In this sense, human rights cases are not foreign
relations cases (indeed, in many cases, they are not foreign relations cases in any
sense). Critics of human rights litigation under state law might characterize this
function as an exercise of foreign relations in order to invoke the foreign
relations preemption doctrine.448 But providing a remedy for a wrong does not
become foreign relations policymaking merely because the wrong happens to
violate international human rights law.
This is not to say that state efforts to remedy human rights never cross into
the realm of foreign relations. For example, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council,449 the Supreme Court preempted a Massachusetts statute that barred
state entities from buying goods or services from any company doing business
with Burma.450 The statute was explicitly intended to exert economic pressure
on Burma to improve its human rights and, as such, constituted a state policy

n.11. When applied in foreign relations cases, field preemption is sometimes called “dormant
foreign affairs preemption” and together these two preemption theories are sometimes
referred to as the “foreign affairs doctrine.” E.g., Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG,
670 F.3d 1067, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2012).
446 Childress III, supra note 98, at 995, 1039 (advocating that federal government speak
with “one voice” in area of international relations).
447 Cf. Goldsmith, supra note 339, at 1698 (“There is little reason to think that state control
over matters not governed by enacted federal law affects U.S. foreign relations in a way that
warrants preemption. Of course, states—like corporations, individuals, and federal
government officials—can pursue their self-interest to the detriment of U.S. foreign relations.
The political branches, however, are quite capable of identifying and responding to any
adverse consequences of this behavior. A supplemental federal judicial lawmaking power
discourages such political branch action while creating serious problems of its own.”).
448 See Whytock et al., supra note 11, at 20.
449 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
450 Id. at 366.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140089

476

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:397

targeted toward a foreign country.451 Moreover, there was a federal statute and
a presidential executive order that specifically addressed the human rights
situation in Burma.452 The Court’s holding relied on the findings that the state
statute undermined at least three provisions of the federal statute453 and that the
executive branch had “consistently represented that the state Act has
complicated its dealings with foreign sovereigns.”454 Most human rights
litigation in U.S. courts is unlikely to be based on state foreign policy statutes
targeted at the human rights practices of a particular foreign country, like the
statute in Crosby.455 Nor are such suits likely to interfere with federal statutes
and executive orders expressing U.S. policy on the human rights practices of a
particular foreign nation, as was the case in Crosby.456 Therefore, most human
rights cases under state tort law should be readily distinguishable from Crosby.
In Garamendi, the Supreme Court concluded that federal law preempted
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999, which required any
insurer doing business in California to disclose information about all policies it
sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.457 The Court’s holding depended on its
finding that the federal government, through executive agreements with foreign
countries, including Germany, provided a remedy for Holocaust era insurance
claims, and that there was a “clear conflict” between California’s policy and the
federal policy.458 The Court also emphasized that the executive agreements that
the California law interfered with were designed to restore “friendly relations”
with Germany “in the aftermath of [the] hostilities” of World War II.459 Like the
Massachusetts statute in Crosby, the California statute, which expressed a
California policy for resolving Holocaust era insurance claims, bears little
resemblance to the application of general legal rules to provide a remedy for a
particular victim of a human rights violation. In addition, most human rights do

451

Id. at 366-68.
Id. at 368-71.
453 Id. at 363-64 (holding first that state act “is an obstacle to the federal Act’s delegation
of discretion to the President to control economic sanctions against Burma,” second, “is an
obstacle to the federal Act’s delegation of discretion to the President to control economic
sanctions against Burma,” and third, “is an obstacle to the federal Act’s delegation of
discretion to the President to control economic sanctions against Burma”).
454 Id. at 383.
455 See, e.g., Gabrieldis, supra note 11, at 167-68 (giving various examples of state courts
accepting applicability of human rights, none of which were based on state statute targeting
particular foreign country).
456 See id. at 165.
457 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (“The issue here is whether
HVIRA interferes with the National Government’s conduct of foreign relations. We hold that
it does, with the consequence that the state statute is preempted.”).
458 Id. at 420-21.
459 Id. at 420.
452
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not overlap with remedial mechanisms established between the United States
and a foreign nation after a war, as was the case in Garamendi.
ii.

Weighing a State’s Remedial Interests

Second, even when human rights litigation under state law affects foreign
relations, a state’s interest in providing law for the redress of wrongs should be
given substantial weight in any preemption analysis. In Garamendi, the Supreme
Court distinguished two situations: one in which a state “take[s] a position on a
matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state
responsibility” and another in which “a State has acted within . . . its ‘traditional
competence’ but in a way that affects foreign relations.”460 In the former
situation, the Court suggested that field preemption would be the appropriate
doctrine.461 But in the latter situation, a conflict preemption analysis would be
appropriate, one that takes into account two factors: the “clarity or
substantiality” of the conflict, and the “strength or the traditional importance of
the state concern asserted.”462 The stronger the state concern, the clearer and
more substantial the conflict would need to be to justify preemption.463
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s instructions in Garamendi, some lower
courts have failed to perform the first step of foreign relations preemption
analysis, thus ignoring state interests and erroneously focusing exclusively on
federal interests.464 Courts that neglect to consider a state’s interest in providing

460 Id. at 419 n.11 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
461 Id. (explaining that “Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the National
Government”).
462 Id. (noting that federal foreign policy interest is another question that should be
weighed).
463 Id. (“[I]t might make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality that
would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of the state concern asserted.”
(citation omitted)). An example of this two-part foreign relations preemption analysis based
on Garamendi is Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir.
2012). In that case, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “[f]ield preemption is a rarely invoked
doctrine” but “Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear . . . that field preemption may be
appropriate when a state intrudes on a matter of foreign policy with no real claim to be
addressing an area of traditional state responsibility.” Id. at 1075. It then performed a twopart analysis, first analyzing whether the state statute at issue “concern[ed] an area of
traditional state responsibility” and then analyzing the extent to which the statute “intrude[d]
on the federal government’s foreign affairs power.” Id. at 1075-76. Another case that used
this approach is Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1187-88 (C.D.
Cal. 2005), which first analyzed the strength of the state’s interest, then analyzed the strength
of the conflict with federal foreign relations.
464 See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he very imposition
of any state law created a conflict with federal foreign policy interests.”).
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remedies skew the analysis in favor of preemption and against redress for legal
wrongs.
Even in cases where courts do consider state interests, they often
underestimate those interests. In Garamendi, for example, the Supreme Court
concluded that the California statute was preempted by a “consistent Presidential
foreign policy . . . to encourage European governments and companies to
volunteer settlement funds . . . in preference to litigation or coercive
sanctions.”465 California’s disclosure requirement was backed by regulatory
sanctions and a private right of action.466 The Supreme Court held that the
disclosure requirements were preempted “given the weakness of the State’s
interest, against the backdrop of traditional state legislative subject matter.”467
The state’s interest was insubstantial, the Court reasoned, because the United
States shared an interest in redressing wrongs against Holocaust survivors living
throughout the country.468
Though Garamendi may have been rightly decided on its facts, the Court
erred in suggesting that the state’s interest was not well within the “backdrop of
traditional state legislative subject matter.”469 Providing law for redress of
wrongs is traditional state lawmaking, enshrined in forty-one state
constitutions.470 Moreover, we think the Court erred in suggesting that the state’s
interest in redressing wrongs against Holocaust survivors could not be
concurrent with the federal government’s interest.471 Concurrency in remedial

465

Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 409-10.
467 Id. at 425.
468 Id. at 427 (“The question relevant to preemption in this case is conflict, and the evidence
here is ‘more than sufficient to demonstrate that the state Act stands in the way of [the
President’s] diplomatic objectives.’” (citation omitted)).
469 See id. at 425.
470 See generally Goldberg, supra note 35 (characterizing redress of wrongs as “vested
interest”).
471 We also think the wartime context was responsible for some loose reasoning in the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 712 (9th Cir. 2003). In that
case, the Ninth Circuit held that federal law preempted a California statute creating a right of
action for slave laborers during the Second World War. Id. at 719. The nub of the court’s
reasoning was that the United States had already resolved wartime claims without
“incorporat[ing] into that resolution a private right of action against our wartime enemies or
their nationals.” Id. at 712. Preemption on the basis of legislative silence is often questionable,
but because creation of a private right of action can alter a regulatory scheme, the court may
have been right to think that the federal government’s resolution of the wartime claims
preempted the state-created right of action. The court seemed to go further, however, when it
opined first that “[i]n the absence of some specific action that constitutes authorization on the
part of the federal government, states are prohibited from exercising foreign affairs powers,”
and second that a state “lacks the power to create a right of action” for wartime wrongs. Id. at
714, 716. When it comes to state remedies for human rights, the first statement is inapposite,
466
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matters is a feature of our federal system. Whether a state may create a remedy
for human rights should depend upon a balanced assessment of the state and
other interests involved, not upon a categorical exclusion of state law and state
courts from remedying violations of human rights.
b.

State Remedies for Customary International Law

Another possibility is for states to recognize rights of action to enforce
international human rights law. State legislatures might create a state ATS, for
example, or state courts might supply common law remedies under state or
federal common law to redress violations of human rights.
We agree with those commentators who have concluded that state courts
would have concurrent jurisdiction over the federal common law right of action
recognized in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.472 The current ATS does not specify
that federal jurisdiction is exclusive, and, indeed, the initial statute expressly
recognized concurrent state jurisdiction. 473 In adjudicating the federal cause of
action, state courts would of course be limited to redressing violations of
international law rules that meet Sosa’s standard. Sosa held that a federal court
could recognize a right of action for violating a norm of CIL that is “accepted
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms” of “violation of safe conducts, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”474 This standard may preclude remedies
for at least some human rights recognized by CIL.
To reach further, states might recognize a state law right of action to enforce
CIL. Such a right of action might, however, be more readily preempted than a
suit under state tort law. As Professor Carlos Vázquez has argued, federal law
may preempt state remedies for violations of CIL beyond what Sosa permitted
for federal law.475 Sosa did not present a question of preemption, but the Court’s
concern about the foreign policy prerogatives of the federal political branches

and the second is too categorical. Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent in
Garamendi notes that the California statute creating a right of action for Holocaust-era
insurance claims was not at issue. 539 U.S. at 434-35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
472 542 U.S. 692, 731-32 (2008); see also Miller, supra note 27, at 559 (“Commentators
have recognized for some time that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over international
law claims.”).
473 See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
474 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25 (referring to claims based on present-day law of nations).
475 Carlos M. Vázquez, Things We Do with Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719, 1727-28 (2014) (“[S]tate causes of action
based on violations of customary international law for which there is no federal cause of action
for the reasons given in Sosa are very likely preempted.”).
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might equally apply to state rights of action to enforce CIL, particularly if the
defendants are foreign officials.476
While we do not mean to dismiss the possibility of dormant foreign affairs
preemption of state remedies for violations of CIL in some cases, we think that
the question is a hard one and that the remedial authority and interests of states
deserve considerable weight in the analysis. Sosa’s concerns about federal
judicial authority do not all map onto state judicial authority. The Court gave
five reasons for requiring its heightened standard for a CIL norm to be actionable
under the ATS: first, the common law is now understood to be “created,” not
“discovered”; second, following Erie, federal courts do not have general
authority to create common law, but instead must “look for legislative
guidance”; third, therefore, federal courts have become reluctant to imply private
rights of action; fourth, private enforcement of CIL risks angering foreign
governments and thus creating foreign relations problems for the political
branches; and fifth, the federal courts had “no congressional mandate to seek out
and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations.”477 Most of these
reasons for limiting ATS litigation in federal courts have to do with the view
that federal courts must wait for Congress before fulfilling the government
interest in providing remedies for legal rights.478
State courts, by contrast, may have common law authority to enforce CIL.
States have a constitutionally recognized role in creating law for the redress of
wrongs. Preemption would have to do the heavy lifting in holding that states
lack the authority to create independent rights of action to enforce CIL. But, as
we have shown, the state’s constitutional interest in providing remedies for
rights must have independent weight in that analysis. There is an active debate,
of course, about whether CIL is federal or state law, or something in between.479
CIL may be federal law, full stop, but that would not—by itself—decide whether
476 See id. at 1728 (stressing that executive and legislative branches should have discretion
in this area); see also Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A
Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1627 (2011) (“[I]t would appear that a State Alien Tort Claims
Act with less stringent requirements than contemplated by Sosa would be preempted by the
same structural constitutional concerns that led the Court to limit the federal right of action.”).
477 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-28.
478 Sosa’s first three reasons have to do with the post-Erie understanding that federal
courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, need a license in positive law to recognize remedial
rules. No such independent license is needed for state courts of general jurisdiction to create
rights of action and, if one were needed, it might easily be supplied by a state legislature.
Sosa’s fourth reason for concern boils down to a question of preemption. And its fifth reason
can be read to concern foreign relations or the domestic law limits on federal courts, or both.
479 See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 342 (setting forth “modern position”
holding that CIL has been indoctrinated into federal common law and offering critique
emphasizing this position’s inconsistency with history and structural mandates imposed by
U.S. Constitution).
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a state could create a right of action to enforce CIL as federal law.480 States may
create rights of action to enforce federal law as a matter of course.481
As we see it, critics of state common law remedies for CIL have the burden
of showing that foreign relations concerns leave little to no room for state
remedial lawmaking.482 Sosa did not say that foreign relations concerns alone
required limiting the federal right of action to a subset of CIL. Taking Sosa at its
word, we are unconvinced that states have no remedial role to play because CIL
is a “foreign relations” matter committed to the national government alone.483
Instead, we think the foreign relations concerns that provided one of many
reasons for Sosa’s outcome may preempt a broader state right of action,
particularly where the plaintiff seeks to apply CIL against a foreign official. But
we think these concerns have to be demonstrated, not assumed based on Sosa
alone, in each case. And, even taking Kiobel for all it might suggest, we think it
is doubtful that federal law flatly preempts a state from creating a right of action
for CIL violations abroad.484 Kiobel rested on a presumption against interpreting
federal statutes to apply extraterritorially, and said nothing about state courts
proceeding under state common law.485 We are not sure what applying a
presumption about legislative intent to a state common law right of action would
look like. But the reasons for applying such a “presumption”—really, a “flat

480 As Vázquez discusses, it might matter for Article III jurisdiction over the state right of
action. Vázquez, supra note 475, at 1728 (“There would be no Article III problem even if the
cause of action was based on state law if the underlying substantive law (in this case,
customary international law) were deemed to have the status of federal law for Article III
purposes.”).
481 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562,
1573 (2016) (noting, even in admiralty context, that states have “wide scope” to create
remedies to enforce federal law (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
373 (1959))).
482 This burden may be very hard to satisfy. See Goldsmith, supra note 339, at 1698
(“There is little reason to think that state control over matters not governed by enacted federal
law affects U.S. foreign relations in a way that warrants preemption. Of course, states—like
corporations, individuals, and federal government officials—can pursue their self-interest to
the detriment of U.S. foreign relations. The political branches, however, are quite capable of
identifying and responding to any adverse consequences of this behavior. A supplemental
federal judicial lawmaking power discourages such political branch action while creating
serious problems of its own.”).
483 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004).
484 But cf. Vázquez, supra note 475, at 1728 (noting possibility that “Court will extend the
‘presumption’ [against extraterritoriality] to state laws based on its purpose of avoiding
foreign relations problems”).
485 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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limit”486 on state lawmaking—must take into account the countervailing state
interest in providing remedies for wrongs.
c.

State Remedies for Treaty Rights

Implementing the right-remedy principle with respect to treaty-based human
rights requires treaty interpretation. At its most basic, the question is whether
recognizing a remedy is precluded, implied, or required by the treaty. Answering
this question when a treaty is silent about private remedies requires courts to
decide between two competing presumptions. As Professor David Sloss has
described, the transnationalist approach presumes that domestic remedies are
available for violations of private rights under treaties.487 The transnationalist
approach is founded on the right-remedy principle.488 By contrast, the nationalist
approach presumes that domestic remedies are not available for private treaty
rights, on the theory that the executive controls treaty enforcement.489
In the federal courts, claims based upon treaties have run into nationalist
barriers in the past three decades. The question of private enforcement of treaties
under federal law is complicated by the distinction in U.S. law between selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties.490 In Medellin v. Texas,491 the
Supreme Court endorsed the nationalist presumption in dictum: “Even when
treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the
background presumption is that ‘[i]nternational agreements, even those directly
benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for
a private cause of action in domestic courts.’”492
As with remedies for CIL, states might pass legislation creating a right of
action to enforce human rights treaties, at least those treaties the United States
has ratified. Or state courts might imply private rights of action from the treaty

486

Vásquez, supra note 475, at 1729 (“[T]he presumption would not function as a
presumption but rather as a flat limit on state legislative power . . . .”).
487 David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme
Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 34
(2006) (“[I]f a treaty has the status of supreme federal law, and it creates or protects individual
rights, the transnationalist model presumes that an individual whose treaty rights were
violated is entitled to a domestic judicial remedy.”).
488 See id. at 37.
489 See id.
490 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 719-22 (1995) (discussing interplay between self-execution and private rights
of action).
491 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
492 Id. at 506 n.3 (2008) (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1986)) (explaining result that “Courts of
Appeals have presumed that treaties do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence
of express language to the contrary”).
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itself. We think that the right-remedy principle counsels some leeway today for
state implementation of human rights treaties through private enforcement in
state courts. How much leeway is debatable; as in the case of direct enforcement
of CIL, state remedies for treaty rights may raise foreign relations concerns. On
the one hand, we think there is a good argument that states have the authority to
provide remedial law for the redress of violations of human rights treaties, at
least if the treaties create private rights. As discussed, under our system of
judicial federalism, states have greater leeway than federal courts to imply
private rights of action. Traditionally, the common law forms of action, which
we would think of today as state law, provided a way to enforce treaty rights.493
On the other hand, there may be strong counter-arguments when the relevant
treaty is non-self-executing. Yet it is not clear that this concern justifies
preemption of state remedies for every non-self-executing human rights treaty.
All else being equal, the case for preemption is likely to be stronger in cases
involving rights of action designed to implement treaties directly than in cases
involving generally applicable common law. But we think it is incorrect to
assume that state courts’ authority will be as limited as that of the federal courts
under current law. And one of the reasons we think that is our tradition of judicial
federalism and the right-remedy principle, which together suggest that
redressing violations of rights is an appropriate function of state law.
CONCLUSION
Domestic courts—including U.S. courts—have an important role to play in
human rights promotion and protection. Because the Supreme Court is closing
the door to human rights litigation in the federal courts under the ATS, state
courts have emerged as an important alternative forum for state remedies for
human rights. Critics of human rights litigation in state courts and under state
law emphasize the potential costs to multinational corporations, the risk of
offending foreign countries, and the federal interest in the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations. But judges and scholars should not consider the reasons for
limiting state remedies in isolation. They should also consider the state interest
in redressing wrongs, including wrongs that are violations of human rights.
State remedies for human rights are consistent with two basic features of
American remedial law: first, courts should aim to redress wrongs and do justice
in every case; and, second, state courthouse doors may remain open even where
federal courthouse doors would be closed. The Constitution does not divest the
states from providing remedies for legal wrongs; to the contrary, it reserves to
the states the power to do so, including in the realm of human rights.
These principles have important doctrinal implications for human rights
litigation in state courts and under state law. The Constitution reserves power to
the states to remedy wrongs as a way of satisfying the right-remedy principle.

493 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1082, 1144 (1992).
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The right-remedy principle shows that redressing human rights violations is not
primarily about foreign relations, but above all about the basic remedial
functions of state courts. Any analysis of the potential limits on state remedies
must give this state interest explicit, independent, and substantial weight. When
courts conclude that other considerations outweigh the remedial authority and
interests of a state, they must explicitly give reasons for that conclusion.
The implications of our analysis extend beyond human rights. As the federal
courts are decreasingly receptive to providing remedies for violations of
individual rights in general494—whether under international human rights law or
the U.S. Constitution—it is more important than ever that the states are able to
pursue their legitimate interest in providing remedies for rights violations.

494

See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2832124 [https://perma.cc/9C8Y-8F2G] (discussing ways for states to be proactive, given
Roberts Court’s decision to “limit court access”).
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